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INTRODUCTION

U.S. courts increasingly must decide issues involving the laws of
foreign nations. Since statutes comprise most countries' predominant
source of written law, U.S. lawyers and judges with growing frequency
are called upon to translate and interpret such unfamiliar legislation.

Fortunately, the topics of comparative law and statutory interpretation
have enjoyed a recent renaissance in the law reviews. Still, no publication to date has attempted to establish a comprehensive theoretical

methodology that combines these two topics in a way that U.S. practitioners can adapt to make real decisions.'
This article takes a small step towards that end. It aspires to address

academics and anyone who must translate or interpret foreign statutes
without previous in-depth education in the alien language and law.2 To

make matters more interesting, I concentrate on the plight of the minority
of judges who want to arrive at independently reasoned interpretations of
foreign law when given the opportunity. Most judges strive mightily to
avoid even having to glance at foreign laws.' And, when it becomes absolutely necessary to read a foreign code, most judges and litigators retain
the centuries-old habit4 of relying too slavishly on tendentious expert
1. In January 1996, Daniel Farber noted, "The full implications of comparative research for theories of statutory interpretation are undoubtedly yet to be explored.
Unfortunately, there has been little dialogue between serious scholars of interpretation theory
and well-grounded experts in comparative law so far." Daniel A. Farber, The Hermeneutic
Tourist: Statutory Interpretation in Comparative Perspective, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 529
(1996) (book review).
2. I use "foreign" and "alien" interchangeably to denote other nations. (Other authors
use "foreign" to indicate a non-forum jurisdiction within the United States.)
3. See infra text accompanying notes 101-106 discussing some techniques of evasion.
4. A 1611 case from England states:
[Iff at the common law one matter comes in question upon ... [an] instrument
made beyond the sea: according to the course of the civil law, or other law of the
nations where it was made; the Judges ought to consult with the civilians or others
which are expert in the same law; and according to their information, give judgment, though that it be made in such form, that the common law cannot make any
construction of it.
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testimony! Furthermore, while most states and the federal courts currently allow proof of foreign law in a manner similar to domestic law, 6
vestiges of the old approach remain, wherein parties must prove foreign
law as an issue of fact.7 Commentators have long criticized this outmoded
approach.8
Finally, when U.S. judges do resort to independent research, they often mistakenly tend to perceive foreign law as quite similar to domestic
law, and they tend to give naive "plain" meanings to foreign provisions. A
judge might mistakenly believe that she must use a "plain meaning"
method of statutory interpretation from the outset and then compound this
error with the "discovery" of a mistaken "equivalence" of domestic and
alien statutory terms. Most likely, judges merely apply such practices as
the path of least resistance. Often, this occurs unconsciously: judges who
optimistically search for similarities between familiar and unfamiliar law
tend to "find" what they seek, in a self-deceiving process of "wishfulfillment." Practitioners would thus benefit from a methodology that
gives them the confidence and competence to assume more responsibility
for their decisions.9
Anon., 123 Eng. Rep. 789, (Admiralty Ct. 1611).
5.

See infra note 77; ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

365 (1962) (the culmination of oral testimony of experts "can easily produce a caricature of
the institution of medieval oath helpers"); John Henry Merryman, Foreign Law as a Problem,
19 STAN. J.INT'L L. 151, 157-59 (1983); Milton Pollack, Proof of Foreign Law, 26 AM. J.
COMP. L. 470,473 (1978).
6. See RUDOLF S. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 78-81 (5th ed. 1988) (for
a brief survey of pertinent American procedure regarding proof of foreign law). See also
John G. Sprankling & George R. Lanyi, Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law in American
Courts, 19 STAN. J.INT'L L. 3, 4-30 (1983) (for a more detailed overview).
7. See Rudy J. Peritz, Determinationof Foreign Law Under Rule 44.1, 10 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 67, 88 (1975); Edwin P. Carpenter, Note, Presumptionsas to Foreign Law: How They
Are Affected by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1, 10 WASHBURN L.J. 296, 304-05
(1971).
8. See discussion of some disadvantages to this approach analyzed infra note 229 and
Part VI.D.
9. For better or for worse, in most of the world's nations, judges have an affirmative
obligation to discover and rule on the substance of any foreign law presented to them. This
compares to the obligation imposed upon most state courts with respect to the law of sister
states. In contrast, states with "judicial notice statutes" for proving foreign law allow, but do
not mandate, that judges take notice of other nations' laws. One article surveys more than
fifty national legal systems and concludes that, "[w]ith the exception of the common law
countries, a definite trend can be traced everywhere moving toward ex-officio application of
foreign law." Stephen L. Sass, Foreign Law in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Survey, 16
AM. J.COMP. L. 332, 365-66 (1968). See also Carpenter, supra note 7, at 300-04. Germany's system requires judges to know or learn all law everywhere, but aid in this respect
comes from national institutes devoted to foreign law research. See generally Douglas R.
Tueller, Reaching and Applying ForeignLaw in West Germany: A Systematic Study, 19 STAN.
J.INT'L L. 99 (1983). For a number of reasons, the German program probably would not
transplant effectively to the United States. Id. at 145-49; Merryman, supra note 5, at 161-62.

MichiganJournalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 19:37

Part I of this article defines two major paradigms of statutory interpretation-the "plain meaning" rule and "dynamic" interpretation (my
proposed default method). Part II discusses the pitfalls of legal translation
and explicates the analogous problem of interpreting foreign law. Next,
Part III introduces the techniques of comparative law as the essential tools
of the statutory interpreter. In Part IV, I investigate whether the interpreter's task is less burdensome due to the existence of universally
espoused methods of statutory interpretation. The article begins to focus
specifically on statutes, as opposed to foreign law generally, in Part IV.C.
These first four parts set the groundwork for my suggestion in Part VI that
interpreters should engage in a far-ranging yet brief study of the values
underlying the foreign legal system as the best first step on the road to
optimal interpretation. In particular, interpreters should look to such underlying values in order to determine which canons or methods of
statutory interpretation fit the case at hand.
I proceed to analyze dynamic interpretation and the plain meaning
doctrine and then touch upon a foreign law application in which the latter
paradigm works well. Crucially, I argue that one can determine whether
plain meaning will "work well" only by first invoking a generalized dynamic theoretic as outlined in Part V and justified systematically in Part
VI. Tangentially, I inquire whether judges who adopt my proposals for
translation and interpretation should openly discuss such stances in their
opinions. Hence, Part VII initiates a search into the thorny problem of judicial candor. Finally, I turn to an application, summarizing the benefits of
the English version of the plain meaning doctrine and suggesting how a
U.S. judge interpreting an English statute should modify the doctrine for
her own purposes. I collaterally discuss an example of how to approach a
"syntactic" canon using my proposed methodology.
This article contains a comprehensive strategy: it presents similarities
among translation, comparative law, and statutory interpretation. Roughly
speaking, someone laboring in any of these three areas must stake out a
position along a textualist-contextualist continuum. Thus, the more the
reader of this article becomes convinced of the analogy among the three
areas, the more I can reinforce my contextualist stand in any given area by
marshaling the advantages of contextualism in a related area.
Another undercurrent running throughout this article treats foreign
law as an area of controlled experiment, in which judges can learn to become discerning interpreters in a more general sense. I intend merely to
provoke a preliminary discussion. Still, my approach, which discourages
judges from totally forsaking their customary terminology and methods,
hopefully stands less open than some to the following critique:
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Calabresi's [and other contemporary liberal scholars' vision of
the] heroic judge, who can digest an extraordinary variety of
materials-legal doctrine, popular belief, science, history, and
so forth-and transform them into a coherent vision that will
educate the legislature along with the rest of the laity ...has
more to do with a scholar's heroic ideal of a deep judicial mind
and spirit brooding over a rich scholar's universe of legal principles than it does with the world of real judges.'0
Instead, I believe that judges can rise to the occasion."
I. DEFINING TWO METHODS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

The long jurisprudential history of statutory interpretation 2 is characterized by continual warfare between textualist and contextualist
methodologies. In this article, I concentrate on one representative pair of
such enemies: the plain meaning rule (often used by U.S. judges ascertaining foreign law) and dynamic statutory interpretation (a sophisticated
tool which, I will argue, should replace plain meaning as the default doctrine in this area). For convenience, I broadly sketch the contours of the
two methodologies here. Later, some problems involved in using broad
definitions will become apparent.
A. The PlainMeaning Rule
The simplest statement of the plain meaning rule is: "[F]ollow the
plain meaning of the statutory text, except when [the] text suggests an absurd result or a scrivener's error."" But, before plunging into the doctrine,
it is well to listen to Professor Summers, who warns that, "The argument
from ordinary meaning is exceedingly complex.... There is much about
the argument that we do not yet fully understand."' 4 1 use "plain meaning
10. Robert Weisberg, The CalabresianJudicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 256-57 (1983).

11. See Richard A. Posner, Legislation and its Interpretation:A Primer, 68 NEB. L.
REV. 431, 450 (1989) (a pragmatic approach is "taken by the best judges and is thus an attainable ideal").
12. For a "short jurisprudential history:' beginning in the Western tradition with Aristotle, see WnL.AM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 2-5 (1994).
13. Id. at 323 (citations omitted).
14. Robert S. Summers, Judge Richard Posner's Jurisprudence,89 MICH. L. REV. 1302,
1319, 1324-25 (1991). A study of statutory interpretation techniques of several nations frequently notes that when courts speak of "literal meaning:' they "can refer to several entirely
different things." See, e.g., Michel Troper et al., Statutory Interpretation in France, in
INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 182 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S.
Summers, eds., 1991) [hereinafter MACCORMICK & SUMMERS] (collection of works each
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doctrine" to refer to a set consisting of two separate methodologies. One
method declares that if the statutory provision in question is "unambiguous:'
the interpreter will look no further. The other method tries to discern
"ordinary" meaning. This latter technique admits that ordinary meaning can
prove ambiguous at times and that a text deemed unambiguous by an extraordinary community can remain ambiguous when construed by ordinary
people. Thus, a crucial difficulty for the "ordinary meaning" method involves defining the relevant interpretive community:
Should the standard for ordinary meaning be set by how a lay person would understand the disputed statutory terms? Should it
rather be set by the standard of a lay person who is a "competent
and informed user of ordinary language"? Or perhaps a nonlegal
technical usage•...? On the other hand, is a nonspecialist lawyer's
reading the proper norm? Or... a specialist in the legal area that
a statute addresses?' 5
Another problem with the "ordinary"-"unambiguous" dichotomy is that
judges often conflate the two strands.
The plain meaning rule can sometimes stake out an originalist position. In that case, the user will examine legislative history to verify that
what she believes constitutes the plain meaning that had been equally
"plain" to members of Congress. The user follows plain meaning because
it best indicates legislative purpose or intent." Or, a public choice theorist
can cleave to a "harder" version of the rule, seemingly uninterested in the
actual expectations of the enacting legislature.
Then again, according to another typology, the plain meaning doctrine
varies according to the scope of its permissible sources. Deployed at its
least sophisticated level, the doctrine examines a word or phrase without
recourse to the rest of the statute, related statutes, or any other contextual
information. 7 As my empirical study reveals, courts apparently quite often
resort to this rudimentary technique when trying to interpret foreign law. 8
Regarding the other extreme of interpretive sophistication, I will not discuss under the rubric of plain meaning doctrine the idea that the ordinary

discussing statutory interpretation in an individual country; MacCormick & Summers oversaw "The Comparative Statutory Interpretation Group"); infra Part WVE.
15. George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 374-75 (1995)
(footnotes omitted). MacCormick and Summers assume the nonspecialist lawyer's reading.
See MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 517.
16. Id. at 521.

17. "There is what we might call an immature textualism-a textualism that just ignores
the context in meaning, as if meaning were carried in the words." Lawrence Lessig, The
Limits of Lieber, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 2249, 2250 (1995).
18. See infra note 126.
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meaning of a text always remains one fundamental aspect to its correct
interpretation. 9
Neither will this article dwell on the so-called new textualism. On the
one hand, new textualism falls between the two extremes just delineated.
That doctrine does not permit resort to legislative history except perhaps
under some unusual circumstances, although it does permit investigation
of the whole statute, related statutes, and perhaps other materials. Its adherents search for "ordinary" meaning. On the other hand, the doctrine is
"a consciously dynamic approach," if an "excessively narrow" one.2 Instead of joining the ranks of Scalia-analyzers, I devote a subsequent
portion of the article to England's use of legislative history, in which a
Scalia-inspired focus on political structure generates additional insights
and frustrations without, however, engaging most of the subtleties of the
new textualism.
B. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation
This section summarizes the view of the dynamic interpreter par excellence William Eskridge, primarily as synthesized in his 1994 book.
One can define this approach by its negation of originalism; dynamic
interpretation does not seek to divine the intent of the enacting legislature or to glean meaning from the statutory language per se. 2 To put the
matter affirmatively, the dynamic approach maintains the desirability of
interpretations of a given statute changing over time to reflect evolving
societal norms. The approach charts a definite hierarchy of permissible
sources, graphically depicted as a "funnel of abstraction." "Interpretive
inquir[ies]" from the most to least abstract (the least abstract being at
the apex of the funnel) are hierarchized as follows:
Current values
Evolution of statute
Legislative purpose
Imaginative reconstruction & legislative history
Whole act
Statutory text 23

19. Discussed infra in text accompanying note 27.
20. Justice Scalia, at least, does so. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991).
21. ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 118-19.
22. See John Copeland Nagle, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory Interpreter, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 2209, 2215 (1995) (reviewing ERSKRIDGE, supra note 12).
23. ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 56 (original diagram in William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 353
(1990)).
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Eskridge emphasizes that the interpreter should always start with
the statutory text, which plays a prominent role and will prove controlling in many if not most cases. She should give particular deference to
the text when the statute has been recently enacted or tightly drafted.2'
Yet the interpreter should "slide up and down the funnel,"" granting
each contextual factor some weight, for "[t]he funnel assumes that the
strongest interpretation is one that, like a cable, weaves together several
mutually supporting threads."2 Indeed, Eskridge notes that the historical, evolutive, and textual vectors interconnect and mutually influence
each other:
[T]he statutory interpreter's understanding of the plain meaning
of a ... text depends on her understanding the whole story of
the statute, including its historical circumstances and its evolution, which themselves cannot be understood without reference
to the statute's plain meaning. 7
Here, Eskridge refers to the plain meaning not of ordinary speakers of
English but rather of those lawyers who know (at least some of) the
legislation's history. He suggests on occasion that legislated texts should
remain the primary source for interpretation because "citizens" rely on
such texts.2 That claim, however, is highly doubtful unless we mean that
citizens sometimes rely on their lawyers' interpretations. With few exceptions, then, it suffices to consider meaning in light of "legal insiders'
understandings. '"
The insiders' perspective, however, is by definition conservative,
and Eskridge does not hide his preference for the interpretive status quo.
The judge should not abandon the prevailing canons of construction or
social order without due justification. Those justifications most pertinent to foreign statutes will be analyzed in Part VI below.

24. See infra Parts VI.F and VIII.B.
25. ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 56.
26. Id. at 200.
27. Id. at 63, 64. Notoriously, Stanley Fish would go even further in claims for the socially constructed nature of background conditions of "obvious" textual intelligibility. See,
e.g., STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 300-02, 329-30 (1989).
28. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L.
REv. 26, 57 (1994).
29. See Stephen F Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
1057 (1995), and infra text accompanying notes 207-214 ("rule of law" values upheld by
insiders constrained by rich contextual understandings).
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II. TRANSLATION & INTERPRETATION
A. Translation

Scholars and professional linguists realize that translation is an extremely complex and creative activity. It thus sets a treacherous trap for
the naive.' Yet few in the U.S. legal profession appreciate or discuss the
translation process.' Since anglophone judges have been given little
scholarly guidance about how to scrutinize other people's translations of
foreign statutes, since they rarely possess bilingual competency themselves" or have the resources to demand competent new translations
from relatively impartial parties, it is not surprising that the cases sometimes make glaring translation errors.3
30. See John C. McKenzie & Antonio R. Sarabia, The Pleadingand Proof of Alien Law,
30 TUL. L. REV. 353, 368, 373 (1956); Fritz Moses, International Legal Practice, 4
FORDHAM L. REV. 244, 248-53 (1935) (giving examples); Otto C. Sommerich & Benjamin
Busch, The Expert Witness and Proofof ForeignLaw, 38 CORNELL L.Q. 125, 158 (1953).
31. See, e.g., Peter W. Schroth, Legal Translation, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 47 (1986 Supp.)
("Despite its great practical importance, legal translation is little discussed; despite its difficulty, it is frequently assigned to translators without legal training. Plainly both the
importance and the difficulty are commonly underestimated."); Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 20 (1991) ("The
complexity of the problems involved in legal translation makes the carelessness with which
they are approached seem incredible."). A federal district judge recently suggested that
translation is a simple, mechanical process. See Williams v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571, 577 (D.
Mass. 1985) (comparing the allegedly "mere clerical function" of a computer programmer
writing source code to someone translating "any foreign language").
32. See Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 6, at 35. See also SUSAN BERK-SELIGSON, THE
BILINGUAL COURTROOM: COURT INTERPRETERS IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 17 (1990). An
exception: a federal district judge whose fortuitous knowledge of Romanian helped him to
understand the governing Romanian law. See In re The Prahova, 38 F. Supp. 418 (S.D. Cal.
1941).
33. See William B. Stem, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45
CAL. L. REv. 23, 33 n.68 (1957). See also Arthur Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1031 & n.76 (1941) (listing the "inevitabl[e] ...few instances
in which courts, because of errors in translation or for other reasons, have made incorrect
findings of foreign law"); Sommerich & Busch, supra note 30, at 158-59 n. 141; Andrew N.
Adler, Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law in American Courts: A 1983-1995 Supplement to
Adrien Wing's Annotated Bibliography § 4 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
A 1953 examination of available English and New York cases "indicates persuasive
precedent for the conclusion that expert witnesses on foreign law need not be members of the
Bar of the foreign jurisdiction with respect to which the testimony is given, and indeed, need
not even be lawyers:' Sommerich & Busch, supra note 30, at 150. The incompetence of such
witnesses has been manifest for some time. In McFadden v. Mitchell, 61 Cal. 148 (1882),
portions from a Spanish law dictionary were introduced into evidence, as translated by a
non-lawyer who claimed to be "acquainted ...to some extent" with Mexican law. Nobody
objected. See also Banco de Sonora v. Bankers' Mut. Casualty Co., 100 N.W. 536 (Iowa
1904) (party offered to present as evidence definition from a law dictionary allegedly in
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Understanding even the basic conclusions of contemporary translation theory could significantly assist monolingual lawyers and judges.
To make discussion of translation a little less daunting, Lawrence Lessig
separates the process of translation into two components, "familiarity"
and "equivalence." Familiarity requires that the translator feel "at home"
in the wider cultures of each language (i.e., the source and the target
language). Ideally, she should "develop modes of thinking that reconnect her with the dynamic fields of words, modes of thinking that will
allow her to explore meaning associations within a word and meaning
connections created by words in a specific context. 3" In fact, experience
shows that even if one hopes to master a specialized vocabulary within a
foreign language, the best way to do so involves first studying that language much more generally.35
Next, translation endeavors to find "equivalence in meaning" between the two familiar contexts. Two problems, however, immediately
confront the translator. 6 First, languages never exactly "map" onto one
another. For example, to translate "I hired a worker" into Russian, one
must know whether the worker was male or female. Conversely, consider the task of translating into English what appears to be "female
worker" in Russian. From the perspective of the English speaker, the
fact that the sex of the worker was specified suggests that it is significant; but from the perspective of the Russian, because it is necessary to
specify the sex, the sex is not significant.37
Of course, more significant and subtle translative "gaps" exist. For
instance, the French word contrat includes agreements that Americans
would instead regard as "conveyances" or "trusts," and excludes various
other documents that we call "contracts."3 The trap of similar spelling is
compounded here by the relatively abundant use by the French of synecdoche, the figure of speech in which a part substitutes for the whole (e.g.,
a "hired hand"). Thus, French jurists define contrat by mentioning the
common use in civil law countries, as interpreted by a so-called expert who had studied the
civil law in general, but not the law of the country in question).
34. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1194-96 (1993)
(quoting Rainer Schulte & John Biguenet, Preface, in THEORIES OF TRANSLATION xi (Rainer

Schulte & John Biguenet eds., 1992)).
35. See William Ewald, ComparativeJurisprudence(I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1947 (1995).
36. The ensuing discussion derives primarily from Lessig, supra note 34, at 1200-07.
37. Id. (citations omitted). For a more interesting example of gendered translation (in
the Swiss Civil Code), see Schroth, supra note 31, at 55.
38. See Sacco, supra note 31, at 12-13. See also Sacco's example of "trespass to land,"
id. at 20, and Alexander's of the word "source" in tax law. See George S. Alexander, The
Application & Avoidance of Foreign Law in the Law of Conflicts, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 602,
629 n.121 (1975).
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will without mentioning the need for the will to be declared or the requirement that there be a cause (roughly speaking, a good reason for the
parties to declare their will and for the law to respect it). 9 A translator
not aware of the synechdochal formulation will render a literal translation that leaves out key elements of the French concept.
Examples abound of other legal faux amis, words that look similar
but mean different things. Thus, the French hypothque is not an exact
synonym for the common law mortgage on real property (viz.,
"hypothecation"), contrary to what Black's Law Dictionary implies.4
Another illustration, the slight difference between "act of God" and cas
fortuit ou de force majeure, had an "important effect" on a judicial
holding in Qurbec.4 In Louisiana, importation of the civil law tradition
has resulted in some notorious mistranslations from originally French
statutes. The French word for "cause" has been mistranslated as "cause
of action, 4' and the word "support" in a Louisiana statute is an erroneous rendering of secours (help or aid). 3
Two identically spelled words sometimes require mapping, too.
Schroth notes the danger in "assum[ing] that 'consideration' has the
same meaning in Connecticut and England, or that jurisprudenciais the
same concept in Mexico and Spain."" In fact, as a commentator on
translations of civil codes cautions, "Every legal term carries a variety
of secondary associations conjured up from the lawyer's accumulated
knowledge of law, giving the term a different coloring than it has in the
foreign legal system."4 Another lawyer further notes, "An identical provision of the law of two countries may have wholly different moral
backgrounds, may have been brought about by the interplay of wholly
different forces, and hence the similarity may be due to the purest coincidence."
The examples mentioned above represent the tip of an iceberg which
leads judges insidiously to presume all sorts of identical concepts supposedly shared among diverse legal systems. In the realm of linguistics,
39. See Sacco, supra note 31, at 14-15.
40. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 742-43 (6th ed. 1990).
41. See Michael Beauprd, La Traduction Juridique: Introduction, 28 LES CAHIERS DE
DROrr [C. de D.] 733, 742 (1987) (discussing Gulf Oil Canada Ltd. c. Canadien Pacifique
Lte, [1979] C.S. 72, 73, 75).
42. See, e.g., Austin v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 31 F3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1994) (most
recent of several cases noting the mistranslation).
43. Smith v. Smith, 382 So.2d 972, 974 (La. App. 1980).
44. Schroth, supra note 31, at 53.
45. Charles Szladits, Note on Translations of Foreign Civil and Commercial Codes, 3
AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 71 (1954).

46. Pierre Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law, 35 HARV. L. REV. 838, 853
(1922).
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several scholars have proposed various semantic or syntactic universals.
The search for any invariant core across translations, however, has
proven fruitless thus far. 7 Unfortunately, then, a translator cannot rely
on any facile formulae to dodge the problem of "false similarities" Indeed, two countries can speak closely related languages yet cultivate
markedly different legal systems. Such is the case of Germany and the
Netherlands, between which a high incidence of false similarities in legal vocabulary exists.4' Furthermore, very dissimilar legal cultures still
present the problem of false similarities in translation, as exemplified by
William Jones' careful treatment of classical Chinese texts:
[O]ne of the dangers in using Western legal categories as the basis for analyzing Chinese law is that we will tend to concentrate
our attention on those aspects of the Chinese legal order that
seem most similar to our own legal doctrines and practices, regardless of whether these aspects are indeed central in the
Chinese legal context. ... [T]he elements of crimes as defined
in the Qing Dynasty legal code are remarkably similar to those
in the equivalent Western criminal laws .... [T]he concept of
"criminal law" inherent in the Qing Code is fundamentally different from that in Western culture. Whereas Western criminal
law sees crime as a violation of the right of individuals to be secure in their persons and property, the imperial Chinese legal
order saw crime as a disruption of governmental control. Taking
surface similarities between Chinese and Western law at face
value, then, obscures the fundamental differences that may exist
between these two legal order. 9
Mapping, say, contrat onto "contract" demands creativity. Options
for the translator may include (1) listing some or several of the specific
discrepancies in a footnote; (2) trying to find general values or principles in the French and Anglo-American legal systems that explain the
origin and persistence of the terminological discrepancy; (3) inventing a
new word; (4) refusing to translate; or (5) ignoring the inexactness-i.e.,
construing the isomorphic terms as identical. Under the circumstances,
47. See SuSAN BASSNETr-McGUIRE, TRANSLATION STUDIES 26-27 (rev. ed. 1991)
(Popovid); EDWIN GENTZLER, CONTEMPORARY TRANSLATION THEORIES 63-67 (1993)

(Wilss); id. at 70 (Neubert). The hope for constructing a "legal metalanguage,' as a practical
goal for the future, seems somewhat less hopeless. See G-R de Groot, La Traduction Juridique: The Point of Veiw of the ComparativeLawyer, 28 LES CAHIERS DE DROrr [C. de D.]

793, 804 (1987).
48. De Groot, supra note 47, at 800 n.25.
49. Janet E. Ainsworth, On Seeing Chinese Law from the Chinese Point of View: An Appreciative Look at the Scholarly Career of Professor William Jones, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 547,
555-56 (1996) (citations omitted).
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perhaps the most useful advice one can give to professional legal translators asks them to craft "slightly unusual vocabulary and diction ... to
preserve distance, to maintain the reader's suspicion."50 This suggestion
does not meet with universal approval among practitioners. For instance,
an article from the mid-1950s advocates the opposite procedure:
[I]t is essential that the final draft of the translation be completed by a person who knows no language other than English.
That is, the final version in English must not have a construction
or ring that is foreign to the English-speaking judge or juror."
Nevertheless, among (non-legal) translators, such intentionally strange
translations are widely advocated by a spectrum of different theoretical
schools5 2
The second "equivalence" problem, related to the "mapping" problem, is that various norms of equivalence inhere in various institutional
practices. One of the key contributions of translation theory in the 1980s
was "the discovery of the importance of first establishing what norms
govern translation behavior before analyzing specific translations," since
"every instant of the translation process is governed by norms."53 In
other words, translation is conceptualized as a cultural, not merely linguistic, phenomenon. 5 For example, it may suffice for certain purposes
and audiences to translate contrat as "contract," but we cannot find a
practice-independent guide to what suffices and what does not. Different
translations of the same phrase may be required depending upon

50. Schroth, supra note 31, at 58; see also id. at 59, 65; JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE
AS TRANSLATION 300 n.18 (1990); Ainsworth, supra note 49, at 549 (when translating clas-

sical Chinese laws, Professor William Jones "consciously avoided legal terminology 'too
charged with precise legal meaning for English-speaking lawyers ... '"). See generally

Sacco, supra note 31, at 14-20 (suggestions include that the translator can retain the source
word or create her own, new word).
51. McKenzie & Sarabia, supra note 30, at 367 (emphasis omitted). This claim met with

immediate criticism, although it was later resurrected. See Stem, supra note 33, at 34. To
give McKenzie & Sarabia their due, these lawyers did recognize the useful "startle effect"
derived from emphasizing the "distortion of meaning that is inevitable in literal translation."
McKenzie & Sarabia, supra note 30, at 369.
52. For a history of the "defamiliarization" procedure, see BASSNETr-MCGUIRE, supra
note 47, at 67-68, 71-72. Walter Benjamin and Josd Ortega y Gasset are two of the more
influential proponents of this shock-effect technique. For Benjamin, see John Johnston,
Translation as Simulacrum, in RETHINKING TRANSLATION 42, 44-45 (Lawrence Venuti ed.,

1992); THEORIES OF TRANSLATION 4, 8 (Rainer Schulte & John Biguenet eds., 1992);
GENTZLER, supra note 47, at 194. For Gasset, see Josd Ortega y Gasset, The Misery and the
Splendor of Translation,in THEORIES OF TRANSLATION, supra, at 93, 108-12.
53. GENTZLER, supra note 47, at 136.

54. See id. at 185, 188.
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whether one translates a statute or a contract, or in a brief as opposed to
a memorandum.5
It follows logically yet crucially from these components of transla' 56
tion that "legal translation really means a lesson in comparative law.
Someone fluent in a foreign language will not necessarily be able to
competently translate legal documents, 7 for the familiarity and equivalence skills required must be specifically legal. The U.S. practitioner
confronted by the alien text must self-consciously confront the unfamiliarity of both language and law. That is, compared with a lawyer who
interprets a law without first having to translate it, the translator occupies a position of greater power. If this power is used well, the
translation process will alert the translator to potential problems and
point the way to potential solutions.
For example, no monolingual English-speaking lawyer presented
with a contemporary Turkish statute, a Turkish-to-English dictionary,
and a Turkish legal dictionary for Turks would presume to divine with
any alacrity the "meaning" of the statute or the "intent" of the Turkish
legislature. (In comparison, the same lawyer might well jump to conclusions, based upon a single reading, about a two hundred year-old U.S.
law.) In the former case, the "startle effect" of the language barrier
would immediately convey to anyone the grave dangers of each stage of
the enterprise-viz., "literal" (bilingual dictionary) translation and facile
(legal dictionary) interpretation."8 In fact, the more information at the
U.S. practitioner's disposal about the Turkish interpretive community,
including the higher degree of familiarity with the foreign cultural matrix, including language and law, the easier will be the search for
approximate equivalences between the foreign and domestic systems.
One can apply a foreign statute only if one can understand it, and one
can understand it only if one has some basis for comparison.

55. This discussion is somewhat prefigured in Beauprd, supra note 41, at 739. Much

more generally, it is prefigured in the work of reader-response critics, including but not limited to those cited below (Riffaterre, Fish, Culler, W. B. Michaels). See generally Vincent B.
Leitch, Reader-Response Criticism, in READERS & READING 32-65 (Andrew Bennett ed.,

1995).
56. Schroth, supra note 31, at 49. See also id. at 53 ("The problem of legal translation is

the problem of comparative law... "); de Groot, supra note 47, at 797, 798.
57. Beaupr6, supra note 47, at 744; de Groot, supra note 48, at 811.
58. The language barrier hopefully would also alert that person to the interrelationship
between translation and interpretation. Several mid-twentieth century law review articles
share the naive assumption, discarded in my discussion just below, that in practice one can
separate "translation" from "interpretation" and should assiduously try to avoid the latter
while plying the former. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 33, at 33, n.69, 34; McKenzie & Sarabia,
supra note 30, at 360-61.
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Yet, if the novice U.S. lawyer knows little about Turkey, I will argue
that she should initially search for a "basis of comparison" at the level
of political values which will help to explain the relationship between
the Turkish legislature and courts. The reason why this level of initial
comparison is optimal for dealing with statutes will unfold in my later
discussion of comparative law, but here I link this procedure for translation of statutes to an analogous strand of translation theory. We should
consider adopting Michael Riffaterre's suggestion that a translation
must somehow show-but not necessarily in the same way as the original-that the text belongs to a particular genre and tries to achieve
particular formalfunctions.59 Although Riffaterre and virtually all others
who discuss genre, formalism, or functionality in this context concern
themselves solely with literary translation,' it pays to see how one can
conform this approach to statutory translation as well 6-if only ultimately to indicate again the perils of legal translation.
Here is an example of a formal function that could possibly avail as
one basis for statutory translation. "Ambiguity" constitutes one of the
"categories of expression" that translators of literary texts frequently
want to preserve.62 Yet ambiguity is a functional device for statutes, too.
According to some legal process and public choice theorists, legislators
sometimes effect compromise by deliberately writing ambiguous laws,
so that the courts later must decide the issues that the legislators cannot
or will not decide for themselves. 3
Let us now assume that someone needs to translate a rather vaguely
worded statute adopted by Nation S. We know that not every ambiguous
phrase in the source language can be translated into ambiguous terms in
the target language. Therefore, the translator hoping to preserve a pervading vagueness in the overall text may opt to turn some unambiguous
source phrases into ambiguous target phrases. This is not an easy task.
59. Michael Riffaterre, Transposing Presuppositions on the Semiotics of Literary
Translation,in THEORIES OF TRANSLATION, supra note 52, at 204, 205.

60. Indeed, Riffaterre begins his article by distinguishing literary from non-literary
translation in three ways. Id. at 204; see also GENTZLER, supra note 47, at 99 (formalist

translation studies, despite protestations to the contrary, really focus only on literary translation). But see Octavio Paz, Translation: Literature and Letters, in THEORIES OF

TRANSLATION, supra note 52, at 152, 154-55 (concluding that all translation is literary
translation).
61. Compare Taylor's comment that statutes can be viewed as a genre of law. Taylor,
supra note 15, at 345.
62. Hugo Friedrich, On the Art of Translation, in THEORIES OF TRANSLATION, supra
note 52, at 11, 16; GENTZLER, supra note 47, at 85.

63. See Jeffrey W. Barnes, The Odd Couple: Statutes and Literature, in J. NEVILLE
TURNER & PAMELA WILLIAMS, THE HAPPY COUPLE: LAW AND LITERATURE 296, 303-04

(1995); Anthony D'Amato, The Injustice of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,64 U. CIN. L.
REV. 911, 920 (1996). See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 141-73.
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In general, this "functional" approach works poorly when translating
entire legal instruments such as statutes or treaties:
A translator of a novel has the luxury of making up for what is
omitted here by developing it there. But in translating a treaty or
a contract, one must consider the very likely possibility of interpretation of a sentence or a section out of context. Hence
whatever clarification there is to be must accompany the very
passage to be clarified."
We can add: "Whatever ambiguity there is to be should ideally accompany the very passage to be rendered ambiguous.""5
Nevertheless, given that attempting literal translation can result in
ponderous, clumsy, and biased results,66 the functional approach has an
advantage: it forces the translator more openly to confront her biases,
rather than to assume (always erroneously) that she does not harbor any.
In the above example, it turns out that the very concept of "ambiguity"
is unstable because it is subject to bias. If the translator believes that the
source-text vagueness is merely accidental, akin to successive drafting
errors, then she might try to annotate every ambiguous word in the
source text, explaining each probable meaning. This process might involve a cumbersome if not overwhelming task, except that a translator
who does not initially read a text expecting to find massive ambiguity is
unlikely to "discover" it. In contrast, a translator who firmly believes
that Nation S's legislature is prone to compromise and hence to deliberate vagueness will unconsciously generate or emphasize equivocality in
the source, much as the New Critics manipulated poetry.67
That is, the translator herself helps determine sub silento how
vaguely worded the final translation will be. But, if she knows beforehand that her theory of legislative behavior will color her work, she
stands a step closer to producing the best translation possible under the
circumstances. To put the lesson more generally, the translator should
always strive to remain self-conscious about the methods she embraces.
64. Schroth, supra note 31, at 57.
65. Moreover, even literary translators have heaped criticism upon the functional approach. See, e.g., BASSNETr-McGUIRE, supra note 47, at 26; GENTZLER, supra note 47, at
72, 88, 98.
66. Vladimir Nabokov is the only major commentator who has insisted that only literal
translation is valid. THEORIES OF TRANSLATION, supra note 52, at 6; Vladimir Nabokov,
Problems of Translation: Onegin in English, in id., at 127. Many others argue that the goal is
always elusive. Further, Nabokov's translation of Pushkin's Eugene Onegin requires
"footnotes reaching up like skyscrapers" in order to achieve intelligibility. See id. at 143.
67. The New Critics highly praised ambiguity in poetry, and consequently they managed
to ferret out such ambiguity wherever they looked. See, e.g., R. S. Crane, CRITIcS &
CRITICISM: ANcIENT & MODERN 20 (R. S. Crane ed., 1952).
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If, say, she has to "ignore the plain language of the text in one context to
convey the same meaning in a second, ' 68 she should realize that she has
made choices about what constitutes "plain language" or "the same
meaning" based upon her perceptions of the norms and functions of
statutory translation. Every statute is a formal, legislative document, "an
artifact rather than a plain representation of reality,"69 and it needs to be
translated as such.
In fact, the translator ideally must exercise even greater legal imagination than already intimated in the above example. For, not only should
the translator take a stance about the desirability of ambiguity in the
alien code as applied by an alien court, but she should also consider the
audience for the translation. The technique of "defamiliarizing" the target audience can progress only so far before it backfires. For instance,
suppose that the original law is normally interpreted by Nation S courts
which are adept at construing very vague legislation. A "literal" translation may seriously confuse a Nation T court which interprets only
relatively exact statutes."' The best solution for an S-to-T translation will
keep as much of the Nation S statutory style as remains comprehensible
to Nation T judges. In other words, the final result will be a "hybrid"
between two styles, perhaps representing two different substantive approaches to the legislative process.
Although these statements beg a variety of questions, much of the
remainder of this article will devote itself to such concerns. I will discuss below how all statutory interpretation, not just translation, shares
this problem of specifying an audience. Here, I simply note that a great
deal of contemporary translation theory reflects upon this problem. As
mentioned above under the rubric of "norms of equivalence," scholars
now understand that "equivalence," and "acceptability" in the receiving
culture, are empirical (practice-dependent) matters, and that translations
remain valid only for a given time horizon within a given receiving culture.7 I now list two ramifications of this insight addressed at greater
length below (with reference to interpretation, not just translation):
1. Improvement-Should the translator of statutes try to "improve"
the text to be translated-making it clearer or even fairer? Often, translation theorists frown upon efforts to improve the original; yet
particularly in certain eras, various individuals have waxed poetic about
68. Lessig, supra note 34, at 1206.
69. Riffaterre, supra note 59, at 205 (referring to literary texts).
70. England is such a Nation T. See discussion infra Part VIII.A. Compare, for example,
Germany, where federal legislation often has the character of compromise. See MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 116-17 (explaining why).
71. See, e.g., GENTZLER, supra note 47, at 128-34; Henry Schogt, Semantic Theory and
Translation Theory, in THEORIES OF TRANSLATION, supra note 52, at 193, 199-201.
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the potential enrichment of the target language and culture initiated by
the audience-oriented component of translation.72 Lessig has introduced
a useful distinction between two kinds of "humility" that a judge (and
her agents and witnesses) arguably should exercise when translating:73
"structural humility" which will limit the scope of the translation when
political reasons so dictate 7' and "humility of capacity" which will cabin
the judge's efforts towards improvement when she does not have the
resources or knowledge to accomplish the task competently.75 Not coincidentally, these are precisely the restraints on contextualism that I
stress below.
2. Unconscious Bias-Above, I have maintained that the problem of

unconscious bias is critical when considering translation as an institutional practice. When translating, as elsewhere, people tend to find what

they seek. In general, commentators have become increasingly mindful
that even well-meaning experts-including those appointed by the

court--can harbor unconscious biases."6 Even law professors (whom at
least two scholars recommend as the least partisan experts77) have theo-

retical predilections which color their translations. Yet scholars have
produced case studies demonstrating the unconscious manipulations in
various translated texts, 7 and the legal community should take heed of
such work and spearhead analogous studies. Meanwhile, judges should
72. The "dominant characteristic" of Renaissance European translation theories involved the effort to surpass the original, "to go beyond the appropriation of content to a
releasing of those linguistic and aesthetic energies that heretofore had existed only as pure
possibility in one's own language ... *"Friedrich, supra note 62, at 13. Some features of this
sentiment are taken up by J. B. White in his aptly named book, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION
(1990). Today, deconstructionists argue not only that translation opens up new avenues and
extends boundaries within language, but also that the source text is dependent upon the target text-with each new translation helping to reconstruct or enlarge the source text. See
GENTZLER, supra note 47, at 144-62. Thus, the originating community can also learn about
itself by examining the manner of its translation.
73. Lessig, supra note 35, at 1207-11, 1251-52. The author primarily discusses translation as a metaphor for interpretation. See id. at 1190-91.
74. See id. at 1252-61.
75. See id. at 1261-62.
76. Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 6, at 52-53, 60. Writing more generally, Lawrence
Solan notes that "enormous amounts of interpretation occur without our ever noticing it,"
LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 186 (1993); cf. ESKRIDGE, supra note 12,

at 65 ("The statutory interpreter is constrained-often unconsciously-by the traditions of
the surrounding culture and of her professional culture, just as all interpreters are.").
77. Hans W. Baade, cited in Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 6, at 52 n.306; Thomas F.
Bridgman, Proof of ForeignLaw & Facts,45 J. AIR L. & COMM. 845, 859-60 (1980).
78. Edwin Gentzler suggests that: "[p]erhaps the single greatest asset of Translation
Studies ... is the increasing awareness by scholars in other fields that, in the analysis of
translation, elements of the functioning of the unconscious can be seen." GENTZLER, supra
note 47, at 194-95. Gentzler then summarizes some scholarly work that potentially exposes
such unconscious manipulations within cultural/literary translations. Id. at 195-96.
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responsibly monitor the translations not only of court interpreters7 but
also of expert witnesses, clerks, special masters, alien courts (via certification), and so forth.
B. Interpretation
Interpretation constitutes another component of the important interrelationship between translation and comparative law. In many respects,
legal translation is a special case of legal interpretation. James Boyd
White and Lawrence Lessig are the two most forceful recent advocates
° White states boldly that:
of this insight.W
Interpretation is directly continuous with translation, for one
who seeks to make a text in response to a text in his own language must inhabit his own version of the translator's uncertain
space, knowing that it is impossible fully to reproduce the
meaning of the prior text except in the words of the prior text, in
its context, yet knowing as well that conversations can take
place about such texts in which they are for some purposes, and
in some ways, usefully represented in other terms.8'
Lessig also envisions a continuum:
Every act of communication, the theorist of translation asserts,
is an act of translation. And if so, then what distinguishes
among communications is simply the extent to which this process of translation is more or less self-conscious, or the extent to
which the translators are conscious of the role the background
has on meaning in the foreground. So as a matter of description,
79. See BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 33; and sources listed in Schroth, supra note 31, at
62 n.33.
80. Lessig traces the idea's legal history through the 1980's. Lessig, supra note 34, at
1172 n.32. Lessig also suggests that a century ago Francis Lieber "may have captured the
essence of translation in his distinction between 'interpretation' and 'construction." Id.; see
also Lessig, supra note 17, at 2249.
Specialists in comparative law frequently invoke the term "translate" in the double sense
of traditional translation and interpretation. See, e.g., Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 6, at 43
(The expert witness on foreign law "must 'translate' the foreign law into terms comprehensible to non-experts. Since foreign law must undergo a double interpretation--once within its
own legal framework and again when it is brought into the American legal system-before it
can be applied, the expert must be trained and fluent in both languages and legal cultures.")
(citations omitted). In the following sentence lifted from a judicial opinion interpreting the
Warsaw Convention, one can discern only in context that the source text of the treaty is in
English: "The crux of the problem is that the Appellate Division reached its conclusion by
applying mechanically the literal translation of a phrase without an analysis of the treaty."
Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 203 N.E.2d 640, 641 (N.Y. 1964).
81. WHrrE, supra note 51, at 236 (emphasis added); see generally id., pt. 3 (for a nuanced elaboration).
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we could array cases along a dimension that tracks the closeness
of the interpretive contexts between the source and target texts
(so that at one end stand cases of translation between languages,
and at the other cases of communication within a community).
And when so arrayed, we would also have aligned cases by the
extent to which a process of translation is ordinarily selfconscious or apparent. 2
Lessig then concentrates on intermediate cases, "where the language is
nominally the same but the interpretive contexts are radically different." 3
As I now justify, however, one must dive into philosophy, history,
and the social sciences in order to gain pragmatic familiarity with foreign law. It turns out that an apprehension of the values underlying legal
institutions represents the key to accurate legal translation and interpretation. Therefore, the first task that the interpreter should tackle,
possibly even before she realizes that she must deal with a foreign statute (as opposed to other foreign sources of law)," is to search for
foreign "institutional values."
III. SEARCHING FOR "INSTITUTIONAL VALUES"
VIA COMPARATIVE LAW

The above sketch of the complex interrelationship between language
and law provides only one of several kinds of attacks one could launch
against the so-called textualist approach to comparative law. Such an
approach, in its crude form, attempts to match foreign black letter rules
to functional equivalents in the domestic realm without first examining
the extralegal context in which any such rules flourish. In contrast, a
contextualist approach would wisely enlist overarching "principles" to
help explain and predict the rules. One can conceive of contextualism to
include principles derived either from the social sciences perspective,
from a philosophical or historical perspective, or from all of these
perspectives.

82. Lessig, supra note 34, at 1190-91. Judge Posner critiques Lessig's 1993 article,
averring that "literal translation" and "literal interpretation" are possible and sometimes
desirable. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 492-97 (1995). Lessig further develops his treatment of "fidelity theory," including "structural translation" in Lawrence
Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395
(1995); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365 (1997).
83. Lessig, supranote 34, at 1191.
84. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983).
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A book-length work by Professor William Ewald provides a striking
recent denunciation of both textualism and social science contextualism.
Ewald's dominant conclusion is that to understand foreign law one necessarily must first grapple with "the philosophical principles that lie
behind the surface of the [legal] rules"-i.e., "the how and why and
whence of the legal system, and not just the black letter what." 5 Comparativists therefore routinely "discover" false similarities between legal
systems. 6 Ewald hopes to show through a detailed example that only by
studying the origins and development of modes of thought within a
given system--elucidating how someone in an alien system thinks-can
we avoid such embarrassments. The mere "piling up" of social science
facts or "black letter rules" comprises a misguided methodology from
the start. 7 Hence, learning (in the best practical sense) a given black
letter rule demands attention to a web of interrelated, broad abstractions."8
In a subsequent article, Ewald claims additional support for his
brand of anti-contextualism in the work of Alan Watson. I will have reason to further consider this approach below. 9 Here, I simply note that
Ewald continues to marshal evidence that "the causal relations between
law and society will prove to be reciprocal, interactive, and multilayered," even to the extent that "the phenomena may be too complex
for a tidy description, even in principle."'
Such work in comparative legal theory, if sound, has this consequence for our purposes: superficial research on foreign legal rules (as
opposed to superficial research on principles or values) probably causes
more serious misinterpretations than previously imagined. An unadorned "plain meaning" methodology currently reigns over the
majority of cases interpreting foreign statutes-precisely the kind of
approach that lacks engagement with the foreign countries' "conceptual
wiring" and hence falls most prone to unnoticed yet potentially profound error. So, an attorney or judge unfamiliar with either the "rule" or
the broader context may actually do better to focus on learning the context, and then piece together the rule as best she can.
85. Ewald, supra note 35, at 1896, 1987.
86. Id. at 2044, 2081. Cf Ewald's discussion of "false abstractions," id. at 2112, 2137.
87. Id. at 1988, 2052.
88. Ewald notes the "analogy" to learning a foreign language: "The enterprise is not just
a matter of memorizing a collection of words, but of acquiring a certain kind of ability-the
knack of knowing how to participate in a complex social practice. A language, like a set of
principles, is interconnected, so that any two people who study Italian will inevitably learn
much the same thing... Id. at 2141.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 98-100.
90. William Ewald, ComparativeJurisprudence(II): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43
AM. J. COMP. L. 489, 509 (1995).
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Yet before elaborating upon this approach, I first take care to define
the relevant "context" more broadly than Ewald does. 9' In doing so, I
take a syncretic view of an inevitable future battle pitting Ewald against
those commentators whose work he dismisses. For, many enlightened
social science contextualists perceive the limits of social science interpretation of unfamiliar regimes. These writers delve into and contest
some background assumptions of their disciplines while already following some promising new and broad pathways in comparative law.92 A
lawyer unfamiliar with a foreign legal system who reads such contextualists may well encounter the best balance, that is, she heeds the spirit of
some crucial Ewaldian admonitions yet stays within the realm of what
she can comprehend, rather than straining towards a realm that will always evade "tidy description." It seems best, then, at least in the context
of statutory interpretation, to visualize a continuum from the most abstract Ewaldian "principles" to the most specific "rules":
Beliefs/Philosophical Principles
Political & Institutional Values
Methods/Canons
Rules
"Political and institutional values" include many of the underlying
rationales currently held by members of a legal community. These rationales are not reducible to sociology per se, yet neither are they as
nebulous or difficult to study as, say, Kantian metaphysics. After all,
every U.S. law school teaches students to construct institution-based
arguments. Thus, political and institutional values arguably represent the
optimal level of abstraction with which U.S.-trained lawyers should
grapple. Examples below will indicate how learning such values imparts
useful explanatory power.
Of course, as mentioned above, I address only lawyers who have not
attained prior specialized knowledge regarding any stage along the
above continuum. Someone who has already comprehensively examined
the Kantian foundations of German legal thought or the German Civil
Code probably should not resort to studying German "values." She can
safely overlook this article.

91. See Ewald, supra note 35, at 2129-36, for his psychological and philosophical definitions of "principles" and "rules"; see id. at 2142-43 for an important distinction between
"internal" and "external" principles.
92. See, e.g., Symposium, Comparative Law in the United States-Quo Vadis?, at the
University of Michigan (Sept. 20-22, 1996).

Fall 1997]

Translating & InterpretingForeignStatutes

Furthermore, since we must take the idea of a continuum seriously,
the distinction between "values" and Ewaldian "principles" or "habits of
thought"93 will often blur. The precise level of abstraction at which a
novice lawyer should commence her foreign law research is a matter not
readily answerable. This article does draw an arbitrary bright line, however, between "values" and interpretive "canons," and suggests that as a
practical matter, novice lawyers should always first familiarize themselves with areas of the alien system more abstract than canons.
Interpretive canons lie intermediate along the continuum between
values and rules. 94 Below, I try to employ consistent terminology:
"canons," "methods of interpretation," and "'rules' of construction" all
fall within the same analytic category along the continuum. (I often use
the words interchangeably.) "Maxim" is synonymous with "canon," except when I discuss Grice's maxims of implicature, which arguably
count as "philosophical principles." By contrast, a legal "rule" denotes
the specific proposition of "black letter" law, as defined by cases and
secondary sources.
The term "rule" subsumes "statutory rules," by which I mean any
interpretation of a specific statutory section, phrase, or word. I assume,
however, that the original-language text of the statute needs to be interpreted via methods and canons in order to discover or construct a
statutory rule. Therefore, this article makes a two-fold suggestion when
a novice reads a ready-made statutory rule (i.e., one created by someone
else). Instead of accepting the rule without further analysis, the novice
should first look at sufficient "institutional values" to ascertain whether
a dynamic or textualist method of statutory interpretation should be employed next. I call this stage "pre-dynamic" interpretation.9' Second, the
interpreter should use the chosen method to come to her own understanding of the textual provision. This second step always begins with a

93. Ewald, supra note 35, at 2045.
94. Apparently, Ewald would agree that canons form a middle category:
What I needed to know was something more elusive and fundamental-the prevailing attitude towards the law, the style of legal analysis, what it means for a
European to 'think like a lawyer.' By these amorphous phrases I mean to include,
not just the way lawyers reason about a particular set of facts or interpret a statute,
but also such matters as the prevailing attitude towards courts, the legislature, legal
scholarship, legal education, legal practice, jurisprudence, the basic constitutional
rights, and so on. And I needed not just an exposition of these attitudes and styles
... but more importantly an explanation of the reasons, both historical and philosophical, that have brought them into existence.
Ewald, supra note 35, at 1986 (emphasis added).
95. See infra Part V.
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close reading of the provision, whereas the first step draws upon a wide
range of external sources.9
By concentrating on "institutional values," the novice clearly will
not avoid the compromise and approximation that necessarily accompany a concrete decision about a particular statutory provision. The net
result will inevitably display qualities of a "hybrid" between the foreign
and the relatively familiar, domestic law. For the remainder of this article, I explore whether such a hybrid might serve the purposes of the
litigants and the court better than the ignorant or insincere undertaking
to match black letter foreign rules to plain meaning local equivalents, or
to predict the exact outcome that a foreign tribunal would reach on the
identical facts, or blithely to presume that foreign methods correspond
to domestic ones.'
IV. UNIVERSAL VALUES?
A. Shared Values, Shared Rules,
& Manufacturing Universality
Initially, we should consider possible shortcuts. If our own legal
system shares underlying values with those of other regimes, then, happily, we could expect one of two results. At best, legal rules might have
developed along parallel routes, so that rules (or terms) that appear
similar might actually represent near-equivalents. Such homologization
domesticates the task of translation and interpretation. Alternatively,
even if the foreign rule seems incomprehensible to us, we could try to
reconstruct a crude approximation to the rule by reasoning from the
shared value down, that is, by imagining how the rule most likely would
have evolved in the foreign environment.
When an interpreter has little relevant and reliable evidence or specialized knowledge concerning the foreign rule itself, she should
proceed to work with the shared value. To anticipate later discussion, if
the interpreter cannot recognize any shared values, then she should next
try to learn and to adapt the strange explanatory value in a "hybrid" with
domestic law. Finally, if the unfamiliar values only cause confusion, she
should resort to a relatively textualist approach. A major impasse, discussed throughout this article in some of its myriad incarnations (e.g.,
96. Granted, the statutory text may point obviously to a single interpretation, i.e., a single statutory rule. That possibility, though, is peripheral when a specific foreign statute
appears confusing to most U.S. lawyers. In the purely domestic realm, the possibility and its
implications become more interesting. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 82, at 492-97.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 111, 124-126, 226-227.
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"wish fulfillment"), asks how to discern if one's evidence is "relevant"
and "reliable"--or how the supposedly "shared" value (or word) is
"recognizable" as such. That is, how do you know if the value is really
shared or just seems that way? One must watch for many traps.
For example, part of the process of gathering evidence about rules
should involve ascertaining whether the rule in question has been
"transplanted" from the interpreter's native regime. Systems that do not
share values can still share rules, because systems borrow from each
other at the level of rules. Professor Ewald, distills and clarifies the idea
of "legal transplants," inaugurated by Alan Watson, as follows:
History shows that, because of the [conservative, prestigeseeking, formalistic] nature of the legal profession, legal change
in European private law has taken place largely by transplantation of legal rules; therefore, law is, at least sometimes,
insulated from social and economic change.9"
Ewald perceives that Watson has studied this empirically testable
thesis mainly with regard to the transplantation of Roman private law to
Western Europe, and that other regions of the law must be examined on
a case by case basis.99 Other commentators also doubt the prevalence of
transplants. ' 0° As reported above, Ewald insists more generally on the
enormous complexity of comparative law-for law neither "mirrors"
society nor stands wholly insulated from it, and hence the search for
common ground at any level whether in principles, values, or rules will
prove arduous. We need not share the degree of Ewald's pessimism, but
we must nevertheless refrain from assuming that any given rule qualifies
as a transplant until we cast beyond the statutory text per se.
B. Judicial Presumptions& Independent Research
Domestic courts often presume, in the absence of sufficient evidence presented by the parties, that foreign law is identical to domestic
law. 1' Such presumptions take various forms. For instance, a court could
presume that domestic statutory law as well as common law prevails in
the foreign nation, or that certain fundamental principles of law exist in

98. Ewald, supra note 91, at 503. For the "nature of the legal profession," see id. at 499500.
99. Id. at 490, 500-04.
100. See Eric Stein, Uses, Misuses-And Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72 Nw. U. L.

REV. 198,203-04 (1977).
101. Such presumptions have survived modern procedural reform. See generally Carpenter, supra note 7.
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all civilized nations. 2 These presumptions, however, usually stand as a
"thin disguise" for the forced application of forum law.'0 3 The

"fundamental artificiality" of the presumption becomes especially pronounced when a statute is involved. "'
Informal assumptions operate comparably to such fictional presumptions. Judge Milton Pollack assumes that, regarding foreign law
issues, "[I]f what is relied upon is law, and not some primitive religion
or the whim of a tyrant, the form of reasoning will be familiar."'0 5 Occasionally, courts even ignore expert witnesses' expositions of differences
"apparently ... [on] the unspoken rationale ... that domestic law is applicable by analogy."' ' These judges typically make little or no effort to

ascertain similarities upon which they fictionally rely.
A few tribunals, however, do conduct sua sponte examinations of
the pertinent foreign law.'O° Some others perform a "cursory independent
research" in order to decide if they are competent to form an opinion (or
should instead invoke the presumption).'O° Depending primarily upon the
extent of the presentation by the parties and the perceived familiarity of
the foreign legal system, other courts have investigated the legal
authorities cited by the parties or engaged in "limited independent research... to supplement the presentation of the parties. ' M

102. See Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 6, at 87. Cf. Statute of the Int'l Ct. of Justice,
art. 38, § (1)(c) ("The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: ... (c.) the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations.").
103. See Alexander, supra note 38, at 610; Nussbaum, supra note 33, at 1037.
104. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 5, at 367.

105. Pollack, supra note 5, at 474.
106. Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 6, at 83 (citing cases). As numerous commentators have pointed out, a court seeking to avoid dealing with foreign law altogether can often
do so by consciously or unconsciously manipulating conflict-of-laws, forum non conveniens,
or comity doctrine.
107. See id. at 80 & nn.459-61; Sommerich & Busch, supra note 30, at 155 n.126; Alexander, supra note 38, at 616 n.63, 618 n.73 (all of these sources citing cases).
108. See, e.g., Seguros Tepeyac, S.A. v. Bostrom, 347 F.2d 168, 174 n.3 (5th Cir. 1965),
modifying 255 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Tex. 1963) (refusing to indulge in presumption that foreign law bore any similarity to local law); Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 265 N.E.2d 739, 742
(N.Y. 1970) (involving court's performance of independent research to check whether foreign law differs so radically as to render a presumption unjustified). This approach is praised
in Rudolf S. Schlesinger, A Recurrent Problem in TransnationalLitigation: The Effect of
Failure to Invoke or Prove the Applicable Foreign Law, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 15 (1973)
(stating that under judicial notice statute, court should do some preliminary research; "no
real clash" between foreign and forum law constitutes a factor favoring application of forum
law); see also Peritz, supra note 7, at 76 (citing case where "court made a prima facie finding
of Turkish law for purposes of motion under consideration").
109. Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 6, at 79 & n.457; see also Sommerich & Busch,
supranote 30, at 156.
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Most judges consider their own research highly reliable. In a 1983
survey, sixty-two percent of judges claimed that such independent research was a "most effective" method to establish foreign law; the
remaining thirty-eight percent called it "somewhat" effective."0
The courts' inquiries, however, very often (implicitly or explicitly)
conclude that alien and forum rules correlate quite closely."' One benign
explanation for these findings of similarity holds that seemingly diverse
legal rules may sometimes be more comparable than they appear or may
have borrowed one another's rules. Another benign explanation recognizes that courts more frequently choose to pursue legal research when
they already know that the alien system lies in relatively familiar terrain.
While these explanations remain indisputable, they present an incomplete picture. The general methodological problem of "wish-fulfillment"
mars the universality thesis. Put simply, interpreters tend to spot false
similarities. Notwithstanding their flattering self-appraisal, jurists who
do not contemplate this problem display a troubling lack of knowledge.
C. False Similaritiesin Comparative Statutory Interpretation
This article now begins to specialize in statutes and to focus on canons of statutory interpretation. As defined above, interpretive canons lie
intermediate along the continuum between principles and rules. As
such, canons act functionally like rules vis-A-vis underlying institutional
values, but canons act like values vis- -vis the rule formed by interpreting the statute. Consequently, proof that a canon is universally
respected would provide evidence, but not conclusive proof, of a universal value underlying that canon. To rephrase the matter: if a lawyer tries
to use a canon without grasping why it exists-without first searching
for values that explain and justify the canon-she runs the danger of
misapplying it and thus misconstruing the statutory text. Thus, the
problem of false similarities only worsens in the setting of statutory interpretation.
First, consider how searching for a rule of construction with a rule
of construction can cause slanted results. Someone who conscientiously
hopes to "find the foreign law" often will initially search out the methods by which the foreigners interpret their own statutes." 2 But, a judge
accustomed to "plain meaning" interpretation will more likely convince
110. Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 6, at 82 n.471, 94. But, commentators typically
worry that judges "may do a half-baked job of research in totally unfamiliar materials and
come to a conclusion without basis in foreign or domestic law." Bridgman, supra note 77, at
854 n.38; see also Alexander, supra note 38, at 616.
111. See Adler, supra note 33, § 5.
112. Bridgman, supra note 78, at 860-61; Adler, supra note 33, § 6.
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herself that the foreign sources also favor the "plain meaning" paradigm. When she reads a French court claiming to predicate its ruling
upon the doctrine du sens clair,she may take the opinion at its word, for
"sens clair" plainly means "plain meaning." Or does it? Diverse doctrines operate in different regimes under the rubric apparently quickly
translated as "plain meaning."... 3 The danger I describe here actually ex-

ists: indeed, amazingly, the jurisprudential foundation for the plain
meaning rule in the civil law derives 4from an erroneously "plain" reading of a maxim in Justinian's Digest."
Even more importantly, some courts mention the doctrine only to
divert attention from the true rationales for their decisions." 5 In France,
for example, the extremely concise judicial opinions, which are rarely
published, typically state formal conclusions without acknowledging the
priorities among conflicting arguments."' "[J]ustification is reduced to
the skeleton of a judicial syllogism. The court states only the legal rule,
the relevant facts and the conclusion."' "7 When the court refuses to
openly recognize its evaluative and creative role,"' however, it still cov-

ertly retains that role. (It is debatable how often insincerity plays a role
here. Later, I make the distinction between conscious and unconscious

manipulation of canons.)" 9
When reading primary sources, however, the researcher should always suspect that the purported rationales might hide the actual. On the
one hand, "elaborate [non-plain meaning] opinions can seduce the
113. See supra Part L.A and infra text accompanying notes 149-159.
114. "Cum in [vierbis nulla ambiguitas est, non debet admitti [violuntatis quaestio."
DIG. 32.25.1 (Paulus, Neratius 1) (Theodor Mommsen & Alan Watson trans., 1985). "[I]n its
original context, this maxim refers to the interpretation of a will rather than of a statute......
Konrad Zweigert & Hans-Jfirgen Puttfarken, Statutory Interpretation-CivilianStyle, 44
TUL. L. REV. 704, 712 & n.23 (1970).
115. See, e.g., Zweigert & Puttfarken, supra, note 114, at 713-15; Taylor, supra note
15, at 357-58, n.165; Farber, supra note 1,at 524, nn.58-60 (citing articles).
116. See MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 172, 177, 184, 190, 199.
117. Id. at 492.
118. See id. at 501.
119. See infra text accompanying note 272. Solan believes that judges choose to distort
rules to suit their ends. See, e.g., SOLAN, supra note 77, ch. 3; cf WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.
& PHILP P. FRICKEY, CASES & MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 626-27 (1995) (stating that
judges manipulate originalist arguments). Other commentators express this view more
harshly: "Deciding a case on the basis of the plain meaning of a rule is, in terms of logic, a
tautology; psychologically speaking, it is hypocrisy, for the judge who renders judgment on
this ground pretends to give a reason for his decision, when actually he gives none."
Zweigert & Puttfarken, supra note 114, at 713 (citing Y. Esser, Die Interpretationim Recht, 7
STUDIuM GENERALE 372, 375, 378 (1954)). Many judges, however, probably sincerely attempt to apply the plain meaning rule-they simply do not know how to contrive better
results. See Book Note, New Dress, Old Hat, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1795, 1798 (1994)
(reviewing SOLAN, supra note 76). In that case, plain meaning is the "true rationale" for their
decisions, even if that method yields poor, unpredictable, or strange results in practice.
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reader into thinking that the discussion reflects the true reasoning behind the result."'"' On the other hand, Nicholas Zeppos has analyzed
United States Supreme Court decisions whose "originalist rhetoric was
used to mask a dynamic interpretation."'' If foreign courts deploy similarly misleading rhetoric, then dynamic interpretation as a true basis for
decisions may prove more universal than one might first surmise.
Nevertheless, in contrast to the textualist's investigation, the metasearch conducted by a "dynamic" interpreter will potentially meet with
an opposite but still self-fulfilling conclusion. The dynamic interpreter's
own cultural traditions and preconceived search techniques necessarily
dominate her perceptions. Hence, in her zeal, she may unconsciously
overlook the subtle constraints by which foreign tribunals feel bound.
The most obvious trap arises when a U.S. interpreter analyzes a civil
law case engaging in "reasoning by analogy." She might not realize that
counterpoised against the case's inquiry into current values stands a
strong respect for the historic legislator.'22 More generally, Stanley Fish
seems to capture a lurking stubbornness even in postmodern sophisticates when he writes:
Someone like me ... who is firmly convinced of the circumstantiality of his own convictions will nevertheless
experience those
23
convictions as universally, not locally true.
A second reason why false similarities may surface in the statutory
arena is that, empirically, several kinds of interpretive stances co-exist
within any given legal system. Different judges employ different approaches, and especially in nations that downplay stare decisis, a
diversity of approaches may flourish, no one of which stands out as the
correct strategy. Therefore, a shallow empirical search for a universalized method of interpretation will, in any event, prove futile or, worse,
lead to an accidental finding of similarity.
Third, a certain percentage of judges do not take the extra step of
tracking down a (perhaps distasteful) alien rule of construction. "Even
when it applies foreign law, the forum frequently applies only so much

120. James P. Nehf, Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons from Judges Interpreting
Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 83 (1994); cf. Thomas G. Kelch, An Apology for
Plain-Meaning Interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, 10 BANKR. DEv. J. 289, 330 (1994).
121. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation,78 GEo. L.J.

353, 367 (1989).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 163-164.
123. FISH, supra note 27, at 467; but see Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in
Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REv. 871, 917 (1989) ("Fish believes
that we can 'just see' similarity between particulars without seeing (and perhaps without

there being) any of the universals that such particulars share as properties.").
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of that law as suits its purposes."'24 Courts, then, use accustomed canons

of statutory interpretation.' z A judge acquainted with "plain meaning"
interpretation will often deliberately choose that method when calcu-

lating the meaning of words in a foreign code. 26 But, that sort of method
is particularly susceptible to wish-fulfillment. Arguably, there is no
surer way to mistranslate a word than to isolate and fixate upon the
word itself.
D. Empirical& TheoreticalEvidence of Universalityin
Statutory Interpretation
Nevertheless, some comparativists vigilant for false similarities and
other hermeneutical snares maintain that there are universal methods
and canons of statutory interpretation. First, an empirical study conducted in nine different (industrialized Western) countries has
concluded that these various legal systems share many interpretive modalities:

These similarities consist mainly of: (1) a set of major types of
arguments that figure in the opinions; (2) the materials incorpo-

rated into the content of such arguments; (3) the main patterns of
justification involved; (4) the modes of settling conflicts between
types of arguments; and (5) the role of precedents interpreting

statutes.'
The MacCormick survey found in the highest courts in all nine systems
a "common core" of at least eleven "basic types of argument," includ-

124. Alexander, supra note 38, at 620 (discussing interstate conflicts of law). As discussed above, we have at one extreme judges who presume the equivalence of foreign and
forum law writ at large.
125. See, e.g., Nicholas E. Vernicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 349 F.2d 465 (2nd
Cir. 1965); Royal Exch. Assurance v. Brownell, 146 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 257
F.2d 582 (2nd Cir. 1958) (ignoring expert testimony, but then applying common law methods
of statutory interpretation).
126. I reviewed dozens of American cases that interpreted foreign statutes, as selected
from compilations in Adrien K. Wing, Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law in American
Courts, A Selected Annotated Bibliography, 19 STAN. J. INT'L L. 175, 188-206 (1983), and
Adler, supra note 33, § 4-10. I employed a methodology similar to that of Nehf, supra note
120. This approach has its limitations, as Nehf concedes. See id. at 45 n.157. In my review,
eighty percent invoked the statutory text as the primary source supporting the decision. Seventy two percent invoked the text as the only source. Several of these cases applied the most
stringent of plain-meaning approaches, interpreting particular words or phrases apparently
without considering the rest of the statute or any other contextual information. Dictionaries
were cited in fifteen percent of the decisions, a significantly greater percentage than in
Nehf's study of lower courts' interpretations of state consumer protection statutes. Cf. id., at
44 tbl. 1.
127. MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 462.
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ing, for instance, arguments based upon purpose, ordinary meaning, and
statutory analogies.1'
The authors contend that these common features "impl[y] a deep
common rationality rooted in shared values," which include "separation
of powers" and "rule of law" values." The authors further aver that
courts try to maintain a complex yet rational, coherent, and reflective
"equilibrium" among these shared values, and that courts deploy a mosaic of second-level directives such as canons in response to a
coherently thought-out view of legal values."O It follows, for these
scholars, that one can explain the reported differences between systems'
interpretive methodologies by reference to political, cultural, and institutional differences. 3'
MacCormick and Summers realize, but do not accentuate, that they
have participated in a somewhat self-fulfilling wish for universality. Their
stated objective, to "rationally reconstruct ...coherent modes of justificatory reasoning" depends upon the same qualities that good translation
requires-imagination, sensitivity to context, and detachment (selfconsciousness)132-yet such qualities do not elude irrationality. 33 Moreover, according to Ewald, appeal to politics and institutions-the first
causes of MacCormick's alleged "shared values"-may mislead us if we
do not explore even deeper, into philosophical origins.
Unfortunately, too, the particular methodology of the survey invites
skepticism about the equivalences that its contextualist authors have
"rationally reconstructed." Different scholars wrote each of the nine
chapters describing each country's interpretive practices; then, the final
section of the book tries to distill the individually authored descriptions
into a grand theory. As Edward Rubin notes, this procedure stifles the ongoing interaction among facts and theorizing essential to obtaining new
insights.' 3' Realizing this flaw, the book's authors then avoid making any
truly provocative or robust claims in the concluding section. Indeed,
Rubin declares that
the section has a "least-common-denominator
13
it"
about
character

128. Id. at 464-65. The countries under investigation included: Argentina, Germany,
Finland, France, Italy, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
129. See id. at 462, 479-87, 534-35.
130. See id. at 536-39.
131. See id. at 4.
132. See id. at 19; see generally,id. at 18-27.
133. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
134. See Edward Rubin, Book Review, 41 AM. J.COMP. L. 128, 134-35, 140-44
(1993) (reviewing MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14).

135. Id. at 142; see generally id. at 139-142.
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Still, any articulable "least common denominator" of institutional
values can give the novice interpreter a key to working with and legitimately simplifying the foreign statutory equation. We should also bear
in mind that the search for common ground within other areas, especially within European
contract law, has recently yielded encouraging,
36
masterful results.
One scholar has taken seriously the ideas of coherence, constitutional constraints, and rational legal justification and used them to build
a theory of statutory interpretation.' Professor Buchwald's theory jettisons the customary interpretive methods in favor of an abstract, formal
coherentist structure. If developed further, his theory could perhaps replace all current initiatives aimed at "disentagl[ing] the countless
threads of statutory interpretation."'38 The theory does fit within my
main suggestion in this article-namely, that an interpreter look to important shared values and then approach a "dynamic" solution within
her own coherent mode of justification. So far, however, Buchwald's
theory remains pitched at too high a level of generality to move anyone
but other academics. Therefore, given that judges certainly will continue
to frame their opinions in the language of "ordinary meaning" and other
standard vocabulary for some time to come, it still behooves us to submit a foreign statute to those standard frames and compare their
respective efficacy.
In another effort to ground statutory interpretation in universal principles, Miller and Sinclair have applied the work of philosopher Paul
Grice on the social constraints on conversation to the "conversation"
between legislatures and courts. 39 Grice's maxims of implicature, at
least as a group, bear resemblance to a jurisprudential "principle," i.e.,
to the kind of principle that Ewald privileges.' 4 As linguistic principles,
the Gricean maxims supposedly enjoy world-wide usage. Wherever ordinary conversations occur, the maxims operate. Every culture, in other

136. See Symposium, The Unidroit Principlesof International Commercial Contracts,
69 TUL. L. REv. 1121 (1995).
137. See Delf Buchwald, Statutory Interpretationin the Focus of Legal Justification:An
Essay in Coherentist Hermeneutics, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 735 (1994).
138. Id. at 751.
139. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmaticsand the Maxims of Interpretation,1990 WIS. L.
REV. 1179; M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language: The Role of Pragmaticsin Statutory Interpretation,46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 373 (1985).
140. See Sinclair, supra note 139, at 382 n.39 (comparing Grice to Dworkin); Ewald,
supra note 35, at 2129 n.513 (comparing his own conception of "principles" to Dworkin's).
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words, has "figured out" how to use the maxims to communicate more
effectively.""'
The next step ponders whether Grice's maxims provide a predictable
foundation for the canons of statutory interpretation. To put the critique
most simply, there may be critical differences between interpreting ordinary speech acts and interpreting (written) legislative texts."
Miller delimits, and thus convincingly reaches, his stated goal-to
show the "homology" between some traditional canons of statutory interpretation and Grice's maxims. But, Miller adds that, because Grice's
maxims apply universally, one can "infer," from the homology, that the
canons embody features of substantial generality. Miller fortifies this
conclusion with circumstantial evidence in the form of the "remarkable
coherence" of the canons over time and space. For example, St.
Augustine espoused the plain meaning rule and its "absurdity" exception; a Hindu text from circa 500 B.C. recommends the "whole statute"
maxim; and so forth. 143 Of course, Miller sounds a cautionary note, too:
This is not to say that maxims of interpretation display perfect
conservation of form across legal systems. There are many variants.... Nevertheless, sufficient continuity exists across systems
to suggest that the maxims must reflect some relatively universal
principles for interpreting legal rules.'"
Bearing in mind the uncertainty of Miller's inference of universality-including uncertainty born of wish-fulfillment-the inference
remains appealing. As with the MacCormick results and other recent
empirical work, it grants us hope that some shared "conceptual wiring"
exists which will allow us to explain unfamiliar, transcultural texts. That
is, the fact of shared methods such as the use of canons often supports
the notion of shared underlying legal values, (e.g., "rule of law" or the
linguistic structure of legislature-court communication), which serve as
the preferred starting point for interpreting such unfamiliar texts.
Before I propose how to reach this hypothesized starting point, I
must deal a blow for chaos: even knowing with certainty which of
Grice's maxims apply universally to written legal conversations will not,

141. We need not speculate about when the maxims came into existence or about
whether speakers notice the maxims working; principles need not be articulated as historically and cognitively derived beliefs.
142. See Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945 (1990). In another
article, I analyze these differences as manifest in fictional representations of legally-effective
speech acts. See Andrew N.Adler, Oaths, "Deeds," & Other Legal Speech Acts in Five English RenaissancePlays, 72 ST. JoHN's L. REv. (forthcoming 1998).
143. Miller, supra note 139, at 1183-91.
144. Id. at 1182.
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by itself, propel us very far in practice. For, the maxims (like translation
procedures) depend heavily upon social conventions. To apply them at
all, one will "always require full use of the context, the intent of the
[statutory] provision, and the purpose of the legislation."' 5 Yet delineating conversational conventions already requires intimate acquaintance
with the interpretive community and its myriad background principles."
For example, even assuming (counterfactually) that every regime invokes the same plain meaning methodology, the relevant community
always defines such key words as "plain," "unambiguous," and
"ordinary language."
E. Universalityof the PlainMeaning Rule-Revisited
Three of Grice's maxims, which, as a group, constitute a universal
principle, support the plain meaning doctrine: The maxim "Avoid obscurity" corresponds to the canon, "Courts should interpret words
according to their ordinary common senses." Similarly, "Avoid ambiguity" corresponds to, "The plain meaning of a statute ordinarily governs";
and "Do not say anything false" correlates with, "Interpret statutes to
avoid absurdity.' ' 411 Unfortunately, however, the correlation between
maxims and canons does not show that the canons derive from universal
principles or values. As discussed generally above, a principle concerning ordinary speech-acts may not apply in the context of written legal
texts created by the legislative process. Besides, Grice's maxims will
not help us in practice without supplemental knowledge of the foreign
culture's conventions.
Still, we can check if plain meaning empirically constitutes a universal method. If universal, then, the method more likely, than if it were
not a universal, derives from a common underlying value, and we can
then profitably employ the method as a proxy for the value. As detailed
above, though, wish-fulfillment comprises a significant problem here.

145.

Sinclair, supra note 139, at 383, 416. The context also determines which maxims

take priority and other strategic choices. See Miller, supra note 139, at 1216. Furthermore,
Grice's theory expressly assumes that the parties to the conversation are sufficiently informed to engage in "cooperative" behavior. Farber has noted that, "In certain situations a
drafter may wish to approach a statute as a communication with an uncooperative or uninformed party." Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of PracticalReason: Statutes, Formalism,

and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REv. 533, 551 (1992).
146. For a critique of the narrowness of Grice's emphasis on ideologically "normal"
discourse, see THE JOHNS HOPKINS GUIDE TO LITERARY THEORY & CRrIcIsM 686 (Michael

Groden & Martin Kreiswirth, eds., 1994).
147. Miller, supra note 139, at 1226-27.
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That is, those who seek plain meaning in other nations often unearth
tainted evidence."'
All of the countries canvassed in the MacCormick study press the

argument from plain meaning into action as the simplest pattern of justification in judicial opinions. Yet the argument surfaces in various forms
and frequencies, and it incorporates various exceptions.' 9 Grossly generalizing, one could summarize the situation as follows: in the United

States, the rule may still flourish in some state courts' 5° and in certain
kinds of cases such as bankruptcy in the United States Supreme Court.'

Germany, Italy,5 2 and the United Kingdom' all relatively favor the rule,
as compared with the United States.
Yet such generalizations encourage one to apply one's own monolithic definition of plain meaning to foreign situations which merit little
comparison."" It is too easy for U.S. practitioners to overlook subtle yet
significant variations. For example, Professor Farber, in reviewing the
MacCormick investigation, underscores the universality of resort to
legislative history, i.e., all nations surveyed by MacCormick permit
some citation of legislative history some of the time. 5' So while Farber

148. Apparently fairly often, for example, foreign opinions mention plain meaning as a
deliberate smoke-screen when "judicially legislating." See supra notes 115-118 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 182, 533; cf the myriad
definitions of the doctrine, supra Part I.A.
150. See Nehf, supra note 120, at 9, 46; but see ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 119,
at 576 n.1 (recognizing that some states, especially California, "have looked beyond the
plain language ... more and more:' and listing numerous articles tracing the decline of the
plain meaning rule in state courts).
151. On bankruptcy decisions, see discussion infra notes 243-244 and accompanying
text. The Supreme Court's alleged tendency to rely increasingly upon plain meaning has
been much debated. See, e.g., Nehf, supra note 121, at 46 n.160; Frederick Schauer, The
Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 715, 716-22 (1992).
152. See MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 224; see also id. at 217, 245,
252.
153. See discussion infra Part VIII.A.
154. Moreover, the MacCormick study cannot stand as the final authority on doctrine.
For example, one article claims, contrary to MacCormick, that the plain meaning rule "has
fallen into almost complete disfavor in civil law jurisprudence.... [I]n practice, it does reappear now and then, and when it does, it usually meets with severe criticism.' Zweigert &
Puttfarken, supra note 114, at 712-13 (citation omitted). Note that the MacCormick study
limits itself to published opinions of the highest courts in each country surveyed. See
MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 13.
155. See Farber, supra note 1, at 527-29. The extreme cases are Sweden, where "very
great weight and force" is accorded legislative history, and England, which was classified as
the only country of the nine investigated that "generally proscrib[ed]" legislative history.
MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 355, 470-77. But see infra text accompanying
notes 281-283.
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certainly admits that systems differ,"6 he downplays the complex heterogeneity illuminated by MacCormick. 5 7 Thus, for instance, Germany
favors an "objective" conception of legislative intent, although "with
less emphasis on the purely linguistic conception" than in England,
while in Sweden, actual subjective intention is overwhelmingly dominant.' Furthermore, Italians rarely cite legislative materials.'9
F. Universalityof Dynamic Statutory Interpretation-Revisited
Unlike the case of plain meaning, a wealth of introductory textbooks
and articles nurture a transnational perspective on dynamic approaches
to statutory interpretation. From such sources, one immediately perceives that many foreign countries have long legitimized non-originalist,
evolutive interpretation similar in important respects to Eskridge's approach.' 60 In general, a hierarchy similar to Eskridge's funnel of
abstraction operates in European civil law.'' And, with the exception of
the United States and the United Kingdom, every nation studied by
MacCormick and Summers widely deploys the so-called argument from
statutory analogy.66 This argument allows a statute to be construed on
analogy to the way other provisions of the same statute, or of a separate
statute, are construed.
Moreover, each of the seven nations consistently invokes a bolder
use of analogical reasoning, called "analogy of law" in Germany. Analogy of law involves the distillation of an overarching principle from
several, and not necessarily interconnected, provisions contained in a
number of diverse statutes. The principle can be as abstract as, say, a
prohibition against "unjust enrichment." The idea is that, once a judge
discovers a "gap" in the statutory law, general values underlying the existing legislation should provide a foundation for filling the gap. Note
that one does not justify analogical reasoning by reference to actual
legislative intent, for, by definition, the method presumes that the situation
to be addressed lies outside the (actual) contemplation of the legislature. If
the "gaps" come about due to changes in extrinsic circumstances, the
156. Farber, supra note 1,at 518, 527-29.
157. Compare Rubin, who is somewhat surprised at the "odd exclusions" from the list

of materials used in statutory interpretation that "certain national courts insist upon." Rubin,
supra note 134, at 132-33.

158. MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 470, 476.
159. Id. at 253.
160. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 48, 345 n.2 (citing original-language secondary
sources of many Western European nations, South Africa, and Argentina).
161. See Bruce W. Frier, InterpretingCodes, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2201, 2209 (1991).
162. MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 471. Each chapter of this study de-

votes a section to describing dynamic techniques of the respective sample nations. Such
sections form the basis of several of the generalized comparative conclusions stated below.
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court might in fact be obliged to fill the gaps in the legislative "scheme"
under such changed circumstances. Thus, judges use the method more
often for older statutes,163 just as Eskridge recommends.
One can stress other correspondences between "analogy" as practiced abroad and "dynamic interpretation" as occasionally practiced at
home. For example, if a law expressly enumerates specific fact situations, must it be read thereby to forbid extension to other situations by
analogy? This preliminary question requires interpretation of legislative
purpose'64 and hence requires the foreign judge to travel to the middle
region of the funnel of abstraction. The judge must also closely read the
precise wording of the statute. One might well conclude, by thus explaining foreign technique in understandable vocabulary, that the civil
law and common law statutory interpretation remain "very similar ...
except for theoretical concepts."' 6
But, as Ewald illustrates, it is precisely the conceptual apparatus
that saves the novice comparative lawyer from error. Therefore, while
undeniably the rest of the world, as a totality, resorts to dynamic methods more frequently than U.S. jurisdictions do, the climate within any
given country should, if time permits, be investigated as unique.
To see why, one merely needs to ponder that many legal systems
once shared a common conceptual basis for evolutive interpretation, yet
these same systems now treat evolutive interpretation quite differently.
That is, the philosophy underpinning dynamic technique in the West
derives from Aristotle and, later, Roman law.'" For political and cultural
reasons, adumbrated below, 67 the English never widely recognized the
dynamic "equity of the statute" approach. In Shael Herman's classification, the British became "legislative agnostics," while the civilian
inheritors of the same tradition became "true believers" in the equity of
the statute (there denominated ratio scripta)-andwilling partners with
their legislators.' Later, the United States took its own relatively antiformalist route, diverging from England's distinctive form of textualism.
As Jerome Frank realized, "equity of the statute" and its civil law counterpart potentially represent a pair of false similarities. We must

163. See Zweigert & Puttfarken, supra note 114, at 710-12.
164. See id. at714-15.
165. See id. at 717-18 (discussing role of case law).
166. See supra note 12.
167. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 296-303.
168. See Shael Herman, The "Equity of the Statute" and Ratio Scripta: Legislative InterpretationAmong Legislative Agnostics and True Believers, 69 TUL. L. REv. 535, 537-41,
548-51, 555-60 (1994); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEiN KOTz, 1 INTRODUCTION TO

COM-

274 (Tony Weir trans., 2d rev. ed. 1987) (comparing English judges' skeptical
outlook with civilian judges' "real partnership with the legislature").
PARATIVE LAW
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perceive the disparate habits of thoughts within each regime to appreciate why and how the methodological differences arose and hence
remain.'
Logically and quite obviously, this warning also applies when comparing any two nations, each classified as civilian. That is, if England,
Germany, and France all once shared the same interpretive posture but
now England differs from Germany and France, it follows that Germany
and France may no longer share an identical stance, either. Empirically,
the situation is suitably complex. MacCormick and Summers downplay
the civil-common law dichotomy, noting that "many important differences" between the interpretive schemes of the countries studied "do not
follow the traditional distinction."'"7 In fact, some systems are not usefully categorized at all. For instance, Herman describes Israel's eclectic
views on statutory interpretation, established over the years via its heritage of English common law, European civil law, and authoritative
religious codes. 7'
When Zweigert and Kotz categorized the "legal families of the
world," they chose style as the prime criterion. 72 Importantly, the crucial
factors contributing to style included:
(1) its historical background and development, (2) its predominant and characteristic mode of thought in legal matters, (3)
especially distinctive institutions, (4) the kind of legal sources 7 it
acknowledges and the way it handles them, and (5) its ideology. 1
In this fashion, these distinguished scholars analyzed the vagaries of the
world's jurisprudentia on the basis of principles. 74 When a beginner
feels that she must divide in order to conquer, she should categorize by
style. She should not shy away from dynamic interpretation. Yet she must
shoulder the burden of analyzing, for instance, the effect of Germany's

169. See Jerome Frank, Civil Law Influences on the Common Law-Some Reflections
on "Comparative" and "Contrastive" Law, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 887, 889-90 (1956)
(reviewing partial English reception of equity of the statute influenced by continental law),
894-95 (discussing debate over the extent of the influence of civil law on common law
"equity"), 904-07 (stating false universalities), 910-11 (holding that rules are intelligible
only when we "relive again the experience of the classifier").
170. MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 508.

171. See Herman, supra note 168, at 551-55; see generally SCHLESINGER E AL., supra
note 6, at 321-22.
172. ZWEIGERT & K6Tz, supra note 168, at 68.
173. Id. at 69.
174. Ewald, however, is relatively dismissive of some of Zweigert's work. See generally
Ewald, supra note 36.
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constitution or of Japan's non-legal restraints upon each country's respective dynamic methodology.' 75
V. PRE-DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION
My strategy will now involve deciding which methods and canons
of statutory interpretation works best in practice. I concentrate on (what
appears prima facie to be) two definable points along a (universally existing) spectrum-dynamic interpretation and plain meaning. Above, I
have recounted tentative evidence of each method's universality. Now,
whether or not the method is applied by many different courts in many
different countries, I ask how someone examining a particular foreign
country's legislation might rationally prefer one method over the other.
I take for granted that different rules of construction work best in
different contexts.' For example, as indicated below, a plain meaning
approach might work best when the United States Supreme Court must
decide bankruptcy cases. So, too, we conceivably should prefer a textualist paradigm when deciding the content of an unknown British statute
but prefer dynamic interpretation when looking at a German law. I will
argue, however, that the choice to invoke textualism in the British setting should depend only partly upon evidence that the British
themselves would appear to apply the "same" method for the same statute. Instead, the U.S. interpreter should rely upon her own
understanding of universalizable, unfamiliar, and domestic values, and
of the costs and benefits of that method compared with alternative
methods. These reasons will be discussed below.
I now rephrase my proposal in terminology invented for the occasion: the U.S. interpreter should create "principled hybrids" via the
strategy of "pre-dynamic" interpretation. The latter term tries to convey
that the interpreter should initially apply the values underlying the dynamic method of interpretation to decide which method(s) of
interpretation will serve best in context. Moreover, the interpreter
should presumptively rely upon the dynamic method throughout the interpretation process unless she has articulable reasons to prefer the
textualist alternative. These reasons will be discussed below.
175. For Germany, see, for example, Ewald, supra note 35, at 2145 passim; MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 109-14; Farber, supra note 1, at 519-20. For Japan,
see generally SCHLESINGER Er AL., supra note 6, at 332-34.
176. Empirically, the United States Supreme Court chooses different interpretive regimes depending upon the particular substantive area at issue. Taylor, supra note 15, at 346
n. 113 (citing prohibition of analogical interpretation in criminal statutes, treatment of legislative history in tax codes, and the Supreme Court's bankruptcy decisions).
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In any event, an exemplary translation or interpretation of a different culture's laws by someone not well-versed in the alien culture must
remain sensitive to large issues-especially, to the conceptual wiring of
the alien system. The way to maintain this perspective is to start at the
most abstract inquiries in Eskridge's "funnel of abstraction." That is, the
most useful clues to what a foreign statute means often arise from a
study of the foreign system's "current values," especially institutional
values, and secondarily, from a study of the "evolution" and "purpose"
of the foreign statute.' 7 The interpreter should "slide up and down the
funnel;" yet initially, she should not concentrate on the more textual aspects, but rather on the values.
Applied to a statutory problem, a clear comprehension of values, if
feasible, will lead to a correspondingly clear idea of the general relation
between the foreign legislator and courts and to a suitable general interpretive methodology (dynamic or textualist). If the domestic interpreter
then looks to the legislative purpose, she will gain insights that legal
experts in the foreign country already possess about how the specific*
law fits into the broader system. These additional insights might help
her choose a methodology appropriate to the specific legislation at hand.
Whichever method she eventually chooses, the interpreter first acquires a pre-dynamic overview and then begins again at the concrete
apex of the funnel and engages the statute's text as her fundamental
source. If by this point she has acquired cogent reasons to restrict source
materials, then the U.S. interpreter will try to ignore such sources as
best she can when arriving at a coherent holding concerning the specific
provision subjudice"'
I call the above suggestion "pre-dynamic interpretation," rather than
simply "a search for values underlying statutory canons of interpretation," because I want to align my method with Eskridge's general
approach. Above, I have already alluded to how a self-consciously contextualist, multiculturally informed method might succeed for
translators and comparative lawyers. Below, I enumerate more specific
advantages to Eskridge's method. It is well to affirm here, however, the
universality and usefulness of the philosophical ideas underlying
177. See supra text accompanying note 23. Below, my examples will reflect this procedure of starting at the most abstract interpretive inquiry of the funnel. Hence, to interpret a
British statute, one should first study the British political framework; to interpret the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court should (and apparently does) look at the evolution and
purpose of the Code.
178. Of course, we face the ubiquitous question (which pervades the law of evidence as
well): To what extent can a judge ignore materials she has already analyzed? Some commentators have accused the new textualists of "peeking." See infra note 308 and
accompanying text.
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Eskridge's system. Critical pragmatism and the dynamic hermeneutic
represent the most sophisticated translation tools at our disposal. This
approach acknowledges that we create meaning via a web of cultural,
historical, and linguistic contexts. Countless commentators have affirmed this fundamental insight of context-dependency.'7
This paramount insight about context is built-in, so to speak, in the
dynamic method. But, since this insight is downplayed or entirely ignored by plain meaning methods, criticism of the plain meaning rule
began over 150 years ago" and has so intensified of late that only a few
professors still defend the rule in any form.' The least sophisticated
variant of the rule is particularly suspect, for, again, meaning becomes
"ordinary" or "unambiguous" only in light of numerous and complex
extrinsic understandings, never on the basis of reading a single sentence
wrenched from the page. This caveat should assert itself with particular
force when we must first translate the code from another language.'82
Dynamic doctrine not only serves us better in theory, but also in our
everyday tasks as lawyers, for competent decisions about U.S. law require competent knowledge of institutional values. Within any legal
specialty, memorizing the black letter rules (in, say, a bar-review outline) will leave one very ill-prepared to analyze any novel case
especially the kind of case actually litigated. This is why law schools
highlight above all else that a slight change in the facts of a case should
often send one back to the conceptual drawing board-back to social
179. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 38-47; Taylor, supra note 15, at 362-66
(citing works demonstrating that "the ramifications of these [contextualist] insights align
with much recent legal and philosophic scholarship"); FISH, supra note 27, at 329-30;
STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING As FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too

141-79 (1994). Several writers like to tender the example of the "chicken" case, Frigaliment
Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
(Friendly, J.). See, e.g., Walter Benn Michaels, Against Formalism: Chickens and Rocks, in
INTERPRETING LAW & LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER 215-25 (Sanford Levinson &
Steven Mailloux eds., 1988) ("To read is always already to have invoked the category of the
d. at 223); and most recently, Paul F. Campos, The Chaotic Pseudotext, 94
extrinsic...I"
MICH. L. REV. 2178, 2186 (1996).
180. Taylor, supra note 15, at 355.
181. For citations to recent criticism of the plain meaning rule, see Zeppos, supra note
121, at 369 n.97. For a critique of plain meaning from a lawyer trained in linguistics, see
SOLAN, supra note 76, at 108-117. Naturally, the academics (beginning with Schauer) who
have recently defended plain meaning in some environments realize that the doctrine is not
"value-free." See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function
of Plain Meaning, SUP. CT. REV., 1990, at 231, 251-52. Schauer would completely agree
with the next sentence of my article. See Schauer, supra note 151, at 740.
182. For the evils of overreliance on dictionaries, see most recently Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561, 1614-16 (1994) (reviewing
SOLAN, supra note 76); Note, Looking It Up: Dictionariesand Statutory Interpretation, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994); Taylor, supra note 15, at 375-76. Of course, resort to, say, a
Turkish-to-English dictionary intensifies the woes of an already terrible situation.
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science, ethics, and innumerable ideas and methods, including "practical
reason" (cognitive skills that transcend intuition, induction, and deduction). 183 Yet the voice of formalism, the view that a pre-existing set of
rules can and should dictate legal outcomes, still makes itself heard in
academia and in the U.S. courtroom. I now turn to various defenses of
textualism and formalism and ask whether these defenses might retain
particular merit in the context of interpreting foreign statutes. (Clearly,
proving that one should not learn domestic law solely via bar review
outlines hardly refutes that admittedly rudimentary tactic when an
overworked judge must pronounce upon the intricacies of Swiss Civil
Code.)
In the ensuing discussion, the reader should keep in mind that the
pre-dynamic method which I eventually hope to justify contains two
steps: (1) initial research regarding institutional values; and (2) dynamism as the default method of statutory interpretation once step one is
completed. Below, I often conflate the two steps, because some arguments show that plain meaning is the wrong route to follow both
generically in all foreign law situations and specifically when confronting foreign legislation. At other times, however, I will shift gears and
discuss advantages and disadvantages of the plain meaning approach as
applied particularly to statutes.
VI. JUSTIFYING PRE-DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION

A. ResourceAllocation
The most obvious advantage to textualism from our viewpoint is its
comparative ease of application with little investment of judicial and
litigant resources.' After all, a court that spends enormous amounts of
time researching a foreign law issue squanders resources at the expense
of its remaining caseload.'85 Because decisionmakers "are likely to overassess their own competency,"'' 6 fewer errors might result if they must
follow a simple rule rather than "immersing themselves in highly complex, technical areas where the probability of error is particularly

183. See Farber, supra note 145, at 537-40, 554-58.
184. Nehf, supra note 120, at 83; see also Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs
and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535,
595 (1993).
185. See Alexander, supra note 38, at 635 (generally, on forum's interest in its procedures, including efficient administration of justice and in ensuring fairness).
186. Schauer, supra note 151, at 732.
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1 7 We know
high.""
that U.S. judges highly rate their own ability to interpret foreign law; yet foreign law sets hidden dangers for the unwary.
Consequently, we may want to take the cynical position that, since
judges likely will make unpredictable mistakes in this area regardless of
their approach, we (the People) might as well constrain them and save
the expenditures associated with extrinsic interpretive aids. This argument does not admit that plain meaning procedure achieves better
results, but simply that, for other, more sophisticated methods, the costs
outweigh the marginal benefits.'u
This article responds in part to the above charge by proposing to
educate judges about how they can educate themselves. My theoretical
hypothesis suggests that a small, inexpensive, and quick amount of
knowledge about underlying foreign values could fuel better judicial
decisions than an intimidated plain meaning approach would. I elucidate
this reasoning in the following sections.

B. Neutrality & Universality
The plain meaning rule may seem purer than other interpretive
schemes because it appears as if one could derive it from neutral first
principles of linguistics or philosophy of language. If true, this neutral
foundation would set plain meaning apart from, and perhaps raise it
above, its messy, pragmatic rivals, which were designed to reach particular substantive outcomes. However, the deconstructionists have
relentlessly exposed the illusory quality of plain meaning's apparent
foundation." 9 Further, Zeppos has demonstrated that the new textualism,
"[a]s much as any other theory of statutory interpretation... has a clear
normative agenda."' 9 For example, "the public choice strand of textualism, in urging that statutes be given a narrow interpretation [to reign in
special-interest legislation], seeks to correct what it perceives as the
shortcomings of the legislative process."' 9' Also, especially since the
187. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction
and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 658 (1992); see also Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of
Statutory Interpretation,76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1368 (1990) (arguing that questions of cost,
access, and implementation are relevant to choice of theory).

188. Much more speculatively, one could contend that courts should deliberately use
greater resources for cases involving only local interests. Arguably, a moral imperative dictates that judges should learn their ethics and jurisprudence in the most familiar contexts
first, in the expectation of perfecting their skills before worrying as much about foreign litigants. Such priority arguably is natural, and beneficial for all parties in the long run.
189. See, e.g., supra note 180.
190. Zeppos, supra note 187, at 1331.
191. Id. at 1323. See generally id. passim; William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique
of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1133 (1992).
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normative component varies according to the political structure and
other conventions of each regime, textualism cannot and has not
achieved a definable universality among all nations.'
Even the plain meaning rule's "absurdity escape hatch," recognized by
virtually every nation in the MacCormick study,'93 does not only rule out
statements which are formally illogical. Rather, it excepts from literalism
statements contrary to vague notions of common sense and reasonableness, and it does so upon rule of law rationales." These underlying norms
stay in tension with norms of legislative supremacy (i.e., democratic values).'" Thus, the rule actually varies across systems. Unsurprisingly, the
French courts only extremely rarely invoke the absurdity exception, for
fear of "judicial activism. ' In Germany and Italy, the exception is constitutionalized and thus formulated to invalidate both absurd and
"manifestly unjust" results."" Notice also that where the absurdity argument is invoked very frequently, the plain meaning doctrine starts to
resemble dynamic interpretation and absurdity becomes akin to "clear
inconsistency with current values."'9' Hence, neither the plain meaning
rule nor its principal exception attain neutrality.
Finally, neutral statutory canons are not necessarily even desirable,
even if they were feasible. The flexibility, practicality, and self-revising
nature of anti-foundationalist methodology can benefit the legal system
that adopts it. I expound this benefit in Section G below.
C. Predictability& Coherence-DomesticLaw
The "rule of law" and "democracy" comprise two of the most important values held by all of the nations in the MacCormick study.
Neither value is well-defined, '9 each is open to forceful attack,m and, to
192. See supra text accompanying notes 14, 154-159.
193. MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 485.
194. Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation,44 AM. U. L. REv. 127, 134, 152, 163
(1994).
195. Id. at 164-65.
196. MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 192.
197. Id. at 485.
198. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 359 (1990).
199. "[T]here is no consensus in our polity as to the precise value and implications of
democratic theory and the rule of law." ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 108. "[T]he Rule of Law
is an internally complex doctrine .... MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 535.

200. See, e.g., John Hasnas, The Myth of the Rule of Law, 1995 WiS. L. REV. 199;
MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 534. ("[I]t should be stressed that the appeal to
democracy as a standard underpinning reason that justifies the legislature's authority is always tendentious and contestable, since there are several rival conceptions of democracy, in
particular as between the socialist and liberal visions.....).
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m This
some extent, the two values remain in tension with each other."
article, however, will assume the basic validity and universality of these
values, and it queries whether the plain meaning rule can better generate
them. Under the rubric of "rule of law" values, predictability and coherence of the law are crucial and related components. This article first
addresses these components in the arena of purely domestic law and
then in the arena of a domestic forum interpreting foreign law.
Predictability of judicial decisions is desirable. Probably all legal
systems aspire to protect parties' reliance interests, in order to prevent
forum-shopping and to foster equal treatment, fair notice, stability, and
security in private affairs. "Horizontal coherence" of a legal system
means "consistency with the rest" of the current law as a whole.23 According to Ronald Dworkin and to the legal process theorists, such
coherence is central to governmental legitimacy.2 More generally, the
very idea of systematizing the "law as a whole" falls within rule of law
goals of "norm-based" theories of law. This classification "includes a
great variety of legal theories," all of which share a:

belief in legal rights and duties independent of what a court will
order someone to do in a particular case.... Although not universally endorsed, the norm-based view better reflects lay attitudes
toward the nature of law than does the decision-based view, and
also has a wider acceptance among legal scholars.205
The process of shaping a coherent body of laws concomitantly encourages judges to aspire towards impersonal justice by writing reasoned
justificatory opinions grounded in continuous legal traditions, not idiosyncrasies. 2 6
The pre-dynamic approach arguably engenders more predictability
and coherence in decisions involving purely domestic law than does a
pervasive textualism. Most sources of law originate from educated law201. See infra note 209 (law as equilibrium).
202. It should be noted, however, that the goals of predictability and coherence are also
somewhat in conflict with each other. Creating a coherent body of laws necessarily involves
a search for generality, see Kelch, supra note 120, at 304, especially in civil law countries,
where judges prefer to distill abstract propositions rather than distinguish factual situations.
Coherence might thus produce predictability in the long run, as lawyers learn the generalized
canons; but, in individual cases, predictability might suffer.
203. ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 239.
204. See generally id. at 146-47, and references contained therein. Ernest Weinrib's defense of legal formalism is another theory currently under debate that relies upon a notion of
juridical coherence. See DENNIS PATrERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 28-35 (1996) (discussing and
criticizing Weinrib's theory).
205. Michael C. Doff, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REv. 651, 669-70
(1995).
206. See id. at 668, 683, 686-87.
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yers who expect that their audience will approach their texts "with a rich
contextual understanding of previous law, the politics of the enactment,

the affected business activity, and the dynamics of legal implementation
in the area."' 0 While sharing background understandings, the lawmaker
and various audience members will arguably reach relatively dissimilar,
incoherent results if an interpreter decides to become a willful outsider
to the community by ignoring everything but the rules laid down or the
words on the page.r
That is, except with regard to "willful outsiders," a host of shared
(domestic) pre-dynamic conventions already confines both textualists
and dynamic statutory interpreters, and these conventions lead to relatively predictable outcomes. Law amounts to a cultural understanding,
constrained by an equilibrium among conflicting traditions, which presupposes a cooperative community of interpreters." Since conservative
doctrine (textualism, originalism, formalism) in the hands of a sophisticated ("insider") judge serves as an "efficient organizing device 2 '0 and

not as a wooden formula, the judge ideally will always retain her sensitivity to the legislature's policy-making prerogatives, and yet will read
expansively when the legislature intentionally leaves an area open."'
So, too, Eskridge envisions a host of restraints already reining in
dynamic judges. Indeed, it has been claimed that, "Eskridge has painted

207. Farber, supra note 145, at 553 (discussing legislation).
208. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 145-146; Ross, supra note 30; David L.
Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 921, 942
(1992) (stating that most legislation "occurs against a background of customs and understandings of the way things are done," and that this fact has ramifications for judges hoping
to "cooperate" in a conversation with the legislature).
209. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 65, 196-97 (summarizing Stanley Fish). See also
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 28; Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation,73 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1085, 1090-91 (1995) ("The faithful interpreter, then, is not merely a literal reader, but
faithful to the many broader concerns wrapped up in the established practices of the legal
interpretive community."); Allan Hutchinson & Derek Morgan, The Semiology of Statutes, 21
HARV. J. LEGIS. 583, 594 (1984) (book review) ("Communities of interpretation have their
own bonding mechanisms, a mixture of moral values and social customs. Interpretation is
inextricably bound up with values ... "'); Dougherty, supra note 194, at 164 (asserting equilibrium among rule of law and democratic values in other countries' systems).
210. Zeppos, supra note 121, at 411 n.317 (discussing originalism); cf. Farber, supra
note 145, at 548 (stating that formalism is "more of a 'mood' than a theory," since it does not
wholly reject non-literalistic methods).
211. Cf Nagle, supra note 22, at 2236 (positing that a textualist judge must use dynamic methods when the statutory language is not plain in its immediate context). Nagle
believes that the "absurdity" exception works well in that it rationally constrains judges more
than a (dynamic) "unreasonability" exception. Id. at 2229-30. But, as mentioned above,
deciding what is absurd depends mainly upon deciding what the particular culture conceives
as unreasonable.
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a picture of dynamic interpretation by a nondynamic judiciary" ' 2" We
should see this constraint as both empirical and normative. Judges both
do and should try under most circumstances to respect deeply embedded
values and to preserve continuity over change."' In this light, many
well-established canons of interpretation implicitly conserve current
social practice and the reliance interest of commercial parties. t 4
Empirically, textualism does not reach its main goal of predictable
outcomes. For instance, a recent survey of lower court interpretations of
state consumer protection statutes found that textualism grants just as
much discretion as the evolutive approach."' Also, even the most infamous of new textualist jurists sometimes reach opposing conclusions
about the alleged single "true" meaning of a statute.1 6 Some commentators, however, dispute these findings and claim that dynamic interpretation is even less predictable. 27 Therefore, no clear winner emerges here,
in the domestic realm, between the two methods-although, as explained below, judges may well write increasingly better dynamic
opinions once they obtain more practice with the dynamic mode.
D. Predictability& Coherence-ForeignLaw
Now let us turn our attention to interpreting foreign law. Here, the
chance of either interpretive method delivering predictable or coherent
results further declines. Serious questions then emerge: Should the
judge consciously reach a "hybrid" result, mixing elements of domestic
and foreign law? Or, should the judge chart a strict plain meaning design from the onset, thereby resisting hybridization and trying to remain
a "willful outsider" to the foreign system? Which alternative fosters
relatively greater predictability and coherence?
212. William D. Popkin, Book Review, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 297, 301 (1995) (reviewing
ESKRIDGE, supra note 12).

213. For the empirical component, see Shapiro, supra note 208, at 927-41. See also
Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretationand the Idea of Progress, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1546,

1553, 1557 (1996) (reviewing ESKRIDGE, supra note 12) (stating that some dynamic interpretation is inevitable, but "even seemingly disruptive legal interpretations ultimately may
serve the long-term maintenance of the legal order"). Others, however, believe that Eskridge
overestimates the amount of dynamic interpretation in the status quo. See Nagle, supra note
22, at 2220, 2230, 2236 (arguing that dynamic interpretation is not inevitable). For the normative component see, for example, ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 200-06; Farber, supra, at
1554-56; Shapiro, supra note 208, at 941-45.
214. ESKRIDGE, supra note 12passim; Farber, supra note 213, at 1556.

215. Nehf, supra note 120, at 83. See generally Taylor, supra note 15, at 357-58.
216. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 119; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 28, at 77.
The absurd result exception gives Scalia play-indeterminacy results. ESKRIDGE, supra note
12, at 134; John Polich, Note, The Ambiguity of Plain Meaning: Smith v. United States and
the New Textualism, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 259 (1994).

217. See, e.g., Kelch, supra note 120, at 329-30, n.225.
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First, consider the case for a deliberate "hybridization" strategy.
While no one has heretofore systematically applied the idea to statutory
interpretation, some comparativists have announced various formulations of hybridization." ' As an example of the "adaptation" of foreign
law, Professor Gregory Alexander discusses a Learned Hand opinion:
Finding that the French law of prescription did not provide for the
substance-procedure distinction inhering in U.S. law, the court
attempted to adapt the foreign law to the domestic law of limitations in the manner most faithful to the essence of the foreign
rule. As the court acknowledged, it did not strictly apply the foreign law, but only its idea of the Civil Code provision on
prescription, which, admittedly, may be quite different from the
intention of the French statute. But in these instances the court
does not apply its own interpretation of foreign law by choice, but
rather out of necessity.... Judge Hand nevertheless considered it
to be the forum's responsibility to confront the foreign law on its
own terms.1 9
In applying that part of domestic law which is most similar to the
foreign law, the court tries to the greatest extent possible to preserve the
"essence" of the foreign law. (The "essence" of the foreign law is
grasped by pragmatic observation, not by mysterious revelation.) But, in
doing so, the court inevitably creates new law, integrating its own values
with the foreign. In the terminology of translation theory, the forum
court forges an approximate "equivalent" to the alien law ("on its own
terms"), and the amount of approximation required is measured by the
court's "familiarity" with the alien law. Arguably, though, the court ideally should first seek out familiarity in the abstract area of Ewaldian
principles and values, and not, as Judge Hand and other judges do, in the
area of rules.22

218. See, e.g., EHRENZWEIG, supra note 5, at 361-62; ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 6 (2d ed. 1993); Alexander, supra note
38, at 626-38; Frank, supra note 169, at 913, 915-16; Alexander Nekam, The Law of Conflicts and Comparative Law: Some Similarities and Limitations, 34 LA. L. REV. 1077, 107880 (1974). This idea is implicit in the proliferating practical calls for international
"harmonization" of laws, too. See, e.g., supra notes 47 (on legal metalanguage), 136 (on
Unidroitgoal of harmonization).
219. Alexander, supra note 38, at 627, 628 (discussing Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Companie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1930)).
220. Few scholars have advocated that judges burden themselves with research on foreign principles. Sass, however, did recommend that judges who wish to apply foreign law
should try to grasp not just the substantive law but also the flavor and character of such law.
See Stephen L. Sass, ForeignLaw in Federal Courts, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 117 (1981).
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The judge should recognize that all identification of universal underlying values betrays a reconstruction of such values based partly on

local conventions, and that her own perspective will be dominated by
the conventions of her own culture. Thus, when a particular domestic
judge grapples with a particular foreign statute, her interpretation will
resemble not so much idiosyncratic prejudices as distinctively U.S.
ones. Although one can strive to join a new interpretive community, in
practice the old familiar norms will constrain one a great deal.
I can concede as much while still maintaining that the pre-dynamic
methodology will help interpreters shift their perspective to one fairly in
tune with the workings of the foreign community. The conventionalist
declaration that such a paradigm shift is impossible can be parried in
two ways. First, we can recharacterize the study of foreign law as an effort
by the dynamic judge to keep her (already active) deeply held beliefs
about the desirability of coherence and predictability. In adopting the pre-

dynamic enterprise, she simply applies these existing beliefs to a larger
(international) canvas.221 Second, a broader critique faults conventionalism
for lacking a convincing account of imaginative innovation."'

Let us assume, then, that it is theoretically possible to form a coherent hybrid. Is this result desirable? It lies beyond the scope of this article
221. Discussing the requirement that interpretations conform to the intent of the enacting legislature, Schanck states:
Conventionalism also, however, observes that within the conventions of an interpretive community there will be standards for evaluating performance and results,
and that it is possible to persuade community members that a particular convention
should be changed or replaced by another because it will better satisfy more
deeply held assumptions.... To the extent that the evolutive approach can replace
previous interpretive constructs... and ... become deeply embedded in our interpretive community, judicial decisions should more closely reflect ... democratic
ideals.
Peter C. Schanck, The Only Game in Town: An Introductionto Interpretive Theory, Statutory
Construction, and Legislative Histories, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 815, 861 (1990). The change in
outlook, if characterized as such, is "built into" any interpretive community: "[T]here are
always tacit understandings about change itself that are ingrained in the psyches of its members." Id. at 839; see also Roger Kimball, The ContemporarySophist, THE NEW CRITERION,
Oct. 1984, at 5, 10
But why should we insist that reflection, in order to be effective, in order to be liberating, must be utterly free from the 'norms and standards' out of which it arises?
Does not the simple fact of our being able to entertain a point of view very different from our own show that we can meaningfully transcend our taken-for-granted
interpretive schemes?
222. For two critiques of Stanley Fish's 1980's output based upon the work of Alasdair
Maclntyre, see Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
639, 665-87 (1990) and S. Alan Jacobs, The UnnaturalPracticesof Stanley Fish: A Review
Essay, 55 S. ATLANnC REV. 87 (1990). As evidence of successful paradigm shifting, consider the many translators praised for their "defamiliarization" technique.
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to defend a detailed analogy to Ronald Dworkin's or any other normbased legal theories for foreign law. Instead, I defend a relatively conservative coherence scheme against the status quo.
The scheme I envision and defend would not automatically castigate
judges for their tendency to deliberately tip the balance in favor of familiar doctrines and methods. We can begin by recalling the above
discussion of translation theory. When the translation yields a crude approximation due to the translator's lack of information or skill, one can
make a virtue of the necessity to capitulate to a more audience-centered
model." 3 Similarly, when a court cannot fully comprehend the foreign
system, it should still try to incorporate the foreign law into its decisionmaking process, but it should concentrate on coining an opinion that
makes sense to U.S. practitioners. After all, the domestic decision will
have no precedential weight abroad. Litigators, laypersons, courts, and
legislatures2 on alien soil most likely will never consult the U.S. ruling,
even if it evidences superior skill and issues from a high appellate court.
Consequently, less pressure exists to produce a globally coherent, or
even globally comprehensible, text. In contrast, U.S. courts increasingly
rely on previous U.S. foreign law decisions. 2' Thus, uniformity among
such decisions is a worthy goal, protecting domestic reliance interests.
In some cases, too, procedural aspects of the U.S. legal system
promise better overall jurisprudence. For instance, federal judges in the
United States command far greater resources and time to make intelligent decisions than even the courts of last resort in England. As
remarked below, one should press this distinct advantage into service,
even if one's methodology and the substantive outcomes might change
due to such resource access.

223. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75 (improvement during translation).
224. Another suggested advantage of plain meaning purports that the rule discourages
legislators from sending different signals to their constituents and the courts. See MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 437-38; Rasmussen, supra note 184, at 597;

Shapiro, supra note 208, at 932.
In effect, the rule allegedly forces the legislature to write clearly. Eskridge & Frickey,
supra note 28 at 37 & n.37 (legislative reversal of United States Supreme Court); but see
Popkin, supra note 212, at 298 (one of several scholars who questions whether American
legislatures react to court interpretations).
As discussed below, this interaction actually seems to work in England, but since the
English Parliament will not bother to peruse U.S. cases, a domestic forum must modify its
weighing of this factor. See infra text accompanying notes 301-307.
225. See Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 6, at 66 ("With the increasing number of foreign law disputes confronting U.S. courts, the use of prior domestic decisions is likely to
expand."); id. at 63, 66 (foreign law questions, especially of particular patterns, are repeated
in domestic courts); id. at 63-64 (traditional rule against stare decisis in questions of foreign
law has been "ignored more often than followed" in recent years).

Fall 1997]

Translating& InterpretingForeignStatutes

Yet, to reiterate, my proposed plan would ask that, even if domestic
courts should concern themselves primarily with the consequences for
U.S. law and its overall coherence, they should nevertheless research
foreign values and resolve (not unlike Learned Hand) to fashion a coherent hybrid solution commencing with such foreign values. Currently,
a majority of judges seem to do something quite different from this
plan. But, their rhetoric belies this disparity, and so we must examine
both.
U.S. judges frequently claim that they venture to predict outcomes.
That is, they attempt to apply substantive foreign law (as exactly as possible) as it would be applied by the courts of the foreign jurisdiction."6
Expressions of this prescription abound in the academic literature.2
But, in reality, our judges still in many ways treat foreign law as a question of fact.'2 This mind-set allows a judge easily to avoid the onus of
conducting her own research. Moreover, as Alexander notes,
"[A]dherence to the fact approach serves to rationalize a court's consideration of the precise foreign rule pleaded in isolation rather than as it
relates to other provisions in the foreign legal system."22 9 Strangely,
some courts even claim that if the statute "alone" is before them, construction is a matter of law, but the question of how a foreign tribunal
would construe the statute is one of fact. ° These practices often result
in a primitive plain meaning reading. The judge typically defers to experts and takes their words literally, without appreciating the context
that might demonstrate the bias of the experts' interpretations.
In theory, this behavior might bring about perfectly tolerable results.
If, say, practically all U.S. judges mistranslate the French word secours
for our "support," then the error will potentially achieve a brand of domestic uniformity. Schauer suggests that the plain meaning rule serves a
"coordination" function for multi-member panels, allowing the court to
reach amicable decisions on relatively unimportant cases.2 1' Farber considers the argument that formalism might help ordinary citizens learn
about statutes. 3 Analogously, the plain meaning rule here effectuates

226. See Adler, supra note 33, §§ 5-6.
227. Sass, supra note 220, at 97; Hilding Eek, Peremptory Norms and Private International Law, 139 RECUJEIL DES COURS [R.C.] 1, 18 (1973) (admitting exceptions, including
procedural rules and "some questions of 'adaptation' of the foreign law"); Imre Zatjay, The
Application of ForeignLaw, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 141,14-24 (1972).
228. See supra note 7.
229. Alexander, supra note 38, at 606 (emphasis added).
230. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Leefers, 274 P.2d 239, 244 (Cal. App. 1954).
231. Schauer, supra note 181, at 255; Schauer, supra note 151, at 724.
232. Farber, supra note 145, at 552, n.100.
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coherence among the set of judges (in their own parochial interpretive
community) who encounter similar foreign law questions.
Yet, if we further reflect upon this, we discover that the current dispensation produces neither predictability nor coherence. First, plain
meaning domestic law decisions have not produced uniformity,233 so the
"willful outsider" stance probably will not succeed for complex alien
law, either. Some minor empirical evidence points towards such failure." Second, the frivolous way in which judges often treat foreign law
bears little relation to lawmaking expressly based on coherent norms.
The standard opinion gives one the impression of a sterile fact-finding
mission, guided by absurd legal presumptions-not of a legal mind
delving into a system of law. If anything, this augurs a shriveled kind of
coherence.235
Tentatively, we can conclude that the dynamic, hybrid alternative
should prevail. One advantage, which however cannot readily be quantified, is that once U.S. judges accord foreign regimes the respect that
accrues from studying comparative law, those regimes will likely reciprocate this respect, such that U.S. litigants abroad will find their native
law treated as a living whole. Certainly, many countries (such as France
and Germany) already possess national institutes devoted to reporting
foreign law to the judiciary. However, it is better to join the rule of law
club late rather than never.
More importantly, rule of law values will crystallize back home, in a
similar way as discussed above for purely domestic law; as judges gain
greater understanding of the (foreign) law's conceptual wiring and
source materials, false similarities and other errors fall away, leaving the
resultant decisions confident, better reasoned, and more coherent. Even
when a judge does not feel confident, dynamic interpretation is relatively likely to succeed, since most countries invoke dynamic reasoning
routinely.
U.S. jurists will nonetheless sometimes have to choose whether or
not to disregard a particular principle of the alien system. Already,
judges are accustomed to occasionally ignoring sister-state law on
233. See supra text accompanying notes 215-217.
234. This claim is speculative, given the relative scarcity of reported decisions repeatedly confronting the same foreign law provisions. But, Sprankling and Lanyi have unearthed
six California rulings, all issued within a seven-year period, which split evenly on the issue
of whether American citizens could inherit under German law. See Sprankling & Lanyi,
supra note 6, at 63, n.376.
235. But see Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 859 (1992), and especially id. at 898-900 (proposing view that law should be proved in a legal proceeding like
any ordinary fact). For critical responses, see Larry Alexander, Proving the Law. Not Proven,
86 Nw. U. L. REV. 905 (1992) and Richard D. Friedman, Standards of Persuasion and the
DistinctionBetween Fact and Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 916 (1992).
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grounds of "public policy" particularly in conflict-of-laws contexts.
But, as a judge self-consciously adapts alien law, she will more likely
come across this difficult problem. International law will provide some
satisfactory answers. 3' Dynamic statutory interpretation provides other
solutions. As formulated by Eskridge, that method will rarely jettison setsome
comers ofhiithe world, the likelihood of
tled understandings, yet in •23123
21
*t
encountering rank discrimination

or revolution23 s (among other situa-

tions) will coax the dynamic interpreter to make exceptions to that rule.
E. DemocraticValues
When confronting a foreign legal order, the judge ideally will already hold reasoned allegiances in the current vigorous debate over
"legislative supremacy" and statutory interpretation.2 Then, in the predynamic process, the judge can decide if the foreign situation merits
similar treatment as the domestic. The legions of defenders and detractors of dynamic interpretation focus primarily on the issue of
democratic values. But, unlike the rest of the arguments presented in
this article for choosing dynamic interpretation as a default, one cannot
readily generalize internationally from the arguments from democratic
values given that each country carries its own unique political structure.
Consider, for instance, the salient question of whether economic selfinterest compels legislators to write "rent-seeking" laws, and if so,
whether courts retain a constitutional mandate and institutional competence to correct for this political dysfunction. Certainly, one cannot
reasonably answer for, say, Argentina, until one knows something about
lobbying practices in that country, not to mention its conception of the
separation of powers.
236. See, e.g., Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law As a Canon of Do-

mestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 (1990) (stating that domestic statutes
should be construed in light of international law whenever possible); Symposium, The Interaction Between National Courts and International Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POLITICS 1 (Fall 1995-Winter 1996).
237. See R. Shep Melnick, Statutory Reconstruction: The Politics of Eskridge's Interpretation, 84 GEO. L.J. 91, 113 (1995) (reviewing ESKRIDGE, supra note 12).

238. Doctrinal or practical upheaval, swift change of the sweeping kind, presents problems for Shapiro's presumption of continuity. See ESKRIDOE, supra note 12, at 137-38. One
district court stated that, in the interest of effective justice, it would not apply Libyan law,
due to the pitfalls of interpreting the laws of a country mired in political unrest. See Couch v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 327 F. Supp. 897, 903 (S.D. Tex. 1971). In Bamberger v. Clark, discussed
below, the court explicitly refused to change its construction of German law to align with any
possible outcome that a Nazi court might have reached on the same facts. 390 F.2d 485, 489
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
239. See generally Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1995) (arguing that all

statutory interpretation involves choice of perspective about democracy).
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Instead of writing abstractly, therefore, I will present below the case
of England, where a U.S. judge must ask, in effect, whether England has
4
something analogous to our constitution's bicameralism, presentment,2 0
and separation of powers requirements. Only if this is the case will she
then have to indulge her predilection regarding whether such requirements necessarily impugn the authority of legislative history. 4'
Two abstract metaphors, however, may marginally help the domestic
interpreter to think about her role vis-h-vis the foreign legislature. These
metaphors are: (1) interpreter as "relational agent" and (2) interpreter as
"translator." Scholars invoke both to justify dynamic interpretation in
situations where altered conditions arguably should cause the court to
construe the statute contrary to specific orders from a temporally remote
enacting legislature.
As Eskridge explains, the relational agent stays contractually bound
in an ongoing relationship with her principal. Of necessity, the contract
embodies both general directives and specific orders, and the agent must
try in good faith to carry out both. In contexts unforeseen at the time of
contracting, however, a given specific order may no longer remain rational or moral, and "the agent must exercise creativity in applying prior
legislative directives," i.e., the legislature's general as opposed to its
specific intent.2 42
In the domain of this current article, we subsume the problem of
changed circumstances under the more pressing problem of unfamiliarity; here, the agent is relatively aloof and uninformed. To the extent that
the lower domestic courts have an ongoing relationship at all with foreign legislatures, it is rather like hiring an outside contractor to repair
any and all distant equipment whenever any emergency arises. The principal cannot expect perfection in such a thankless, strenuous
undertaking, yet the agent still has an obligation to use her best efforts and
whatever rags and twine are at her disposal to fix the broken equipment.
Translation represents a more apt metaphor, and the close relationship between translating and interpreting foreign law has been broached
above. As mentioned in Part II.A, Lessig cautions that a translator must
exercise "humility" and decline to translate when separation of powers
concerns overwhelm the effort to craft a functional equivalent of a legislative directive under changed circumstances. A very similar concern
operates to restrict translation of institutional values-and thus subsidiary
canons, rules, and statutes-across international boundaries. Refusal to
240. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.

241. See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 230-33 (criticizing Scalia's constitutional justifications for new textualism).
242. Id. at 125-26.
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translate at all (evading the case) should comprise the last resort, not the
easy way out.
F. Miscellaneous Characteristicsof the Statute
Within any given nation, interpretive practice will vary depending
upon the characteristics of the statute under consideration. The more
aware we become of the different kinds of domestic statutes, the more
we can fruitfully apply these very distinctions to foreign law as well.
Two helpful recent articles have praised the United States Supreme
Court for its plain meaning constructions of the Bankruptcy Code.2 43
Thomas Kelch describes eight justifications for textualism. His subheadings for these justifications read as follows:
(1) the accepted meaning of language; (2) the pervasive nature of
the Bankruptcy Code; (3) the nature of substantive rights and duties under the Code; (4) established historical meaning in the
Code; (5) the newness of the Code; (6) certainty and predictability
in commercial law; (7) the tyranny of punctuation; (8) the dilemmas of policy-based analysis.'
These justifications do not represent sensible reasons to abstain from
reckoning on one's own (via pre-dynamic interpretation) what
"accepted" or "established" meaning means. One can invoke Kelch's
justifications even when foreign courts have not already cited them.
Nevertheless, they depend entirely upon the specific statute under consideration. For instance, the Uniform Commercial Code, another
"pervasive commercial code" in the United States, seems to demand
dynamic interpretation. 5
G. Improvement Via Experiment
The dynamic approach outlined in this article might improve with
use. Once a judge attunes herself to the relevant conceptual traps and
their solutions, her subsequent foreign law decisions will also improve,
and the initial investment in education will more likely prove worthwhile. Moreover, the conceptual framework of "translation" and
243. See Kelch, supra, note 120; Rasmussen, supra note 184. Other recent commentators have also noted and analyzed these decisions. See Peter H. Carroll, III, Literalism: The
United States Supreme Court's Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy
Cases, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 143 (1993); Bruce A. Markell, Conspiracy,Literalism and Ennui
at the Supreme Court:An Examination of Bankruptcy Cases Decided frm 1990 to 1993, 41
FED. B. NEws & J.174 (1994); Adam J.Wiensch, Note, The Supreme Court, Textualism, and
the Treatment of Pre-Bankruptcy Code Law, 79 GEO. L.J. 1831 (1991).
244. Kelch, supra note 120, at 314-38.
245. See Frier, supra note 161; Zweigert & Puttfarken, supra note 114.
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"coherent hybrids" can improve interpreters' dealings with purely domestic statutes, such as statutes promulgated by sister-states or by a
nineteenth-century congress. 2
Eskridge also believes that his methodology, although vague to

many, 47 can provide a template for enlightened new thought about institutional values. For instance, Eskridge contends that, "[t]here is no
consensus in our polity as to the precise value and implications of
democratic theory and the rule of law." Yet:
[d]ynamic statutory interpretation theory helps us evaluate theo-

ries of jurisprudence, for this discussion impels us to ask what
the rule of law ought to mean, and how law ought to work in a
democracy.2
More generally, Popkin has taken as Eskridge's "fundamental point"
that "interpretation doctrine itself evolves as theories of interpretation
change."249 This is the critical pragmatism favored by many poststructuralists. Indeed, some scholars advocate a general practice of

adopting interpretive structures that remain inherently open to revision. 250 If all goes well, intelligent and self-consciously open-minded
U.S. judges (to whom this article is addressed)2' will develop a style to
interpret foreign codes that will transcend the vague and tentative
guidelines already proposed for them. With this intention in mind, a
judge might seize the opportunity to practice dynamic interpretation.
True, the foreign law case will deal important consequences to the immediate parties. Such a case, however, has little precedential or
signaling effect. Hence, it can profitably serve as a controlled experiment in a new methodology which, once mastered, could benefit
246. It is a truism among comparativists that one can learn about one's own country by
self-consciously studying the foreign. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 1, at 521-22 ("In any
event, the materials on German law, like the other studies of individual legal systems in Interpreting Statutes, cannot help but expand the imaginative space open to us when we
contemplate our own legal system."); Ewald, supra note 35, at 2145-46.
247. See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 22, at 2247.
248. ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 108.
249. Popkin, supra note 212, at 302 (discussing especially ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at
199-201). Farber also sees an educative component of "practical reason." See Farber, supra
note 145, at 558 (characterizing judge as problem-solver).
250. See generally Zeppos, supra note 187, at 1362, nn.315-16.
251. I must agree with Robert Weisberg's admonition that, "[tihe poorer judges had
best remain either mystified or begrudgingly restrained by the old fictions of statutory interpretation." Weisberg, supra note 10, at 256. The worst judges will produce irresponsible
results with the pre-dynamic method, wasting money and time along the way. Since it is
unlikely that any but the most inquisitive judges will catch wind of the ideas in this article or
related works in the field, however, I need not worry that I am instilling an undesirable dynamism in judges relatively ill-equipped to handle it. Cf Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89
MICH. L. REv. 296, 351 n.156 (1990).
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numerous purely domestic decisions, too, and even lead to the "method
of the future."
Such controlled experimentation has arisen in other legal areas. For
instance, Lee Bollinger has analyzed the starkly divergent First
Amendment standards for print versus broadcast media, and he concludes that the two fields provide a continuing experiment in the risks
and benefits of relatively untrammeled versus limited freedom of expression.' 2 And, it is not uncommon for an innovative legal trend to
grow to maturity within a very specialized space.
VII. JUDICIAL PSYCHOLOGY & CANDOR

Articles such as this one often peer optimistically beyond the pale of
current judging practice. Sprankling and Lanyi assumed in 1983 that the
quality of foreign law decisions would "inevitabl[y]" improve as judges'
foreign law caseloads increase.! 3 Yet judges have not become noticeably
more sophisticated in this respect during the years since 1983.4 It is
necessary, then, to investigate how one might expect judges to take the
first confident steps down the road towards glorious dynamic interpretation.
U.S. practitioners might be surprised at the increasing quality and
quantity of textbooks and practice guides outlining many of the world's
legal principles and values. 5 There is also a growing availability of foreign law translations and bibliographies. Additionally, CD-ROM
technology and on-line databases have proliferated original-language
source materials." We cannot reasonably expect the judge to conduct
all of her research sua sponte. She must actively seek assistance by
clerks, masters, and certification such as help from civil law legal institutes.2" Also, counsel should cooperate and take co-responsibility, in
conjunction with the court's active role.2" Hopefully, too, Sprankling
252. LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 85 (1991); cf. LEE C. BOLLINGER,
THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986)

(permitting extremist speech provides a controlled preserve in which Americans can tease
out the implications for unlimited freedom of expression and thus become generally more
tolerant).
253. Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 6, at 92.
254. See Adler, supra note 33.
255. In addition to the treatises already cited, see MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL.,
COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS (1985); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW

TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, &EAST ASIA (1994).
256. See generally MORRIS L. COHEN & KENT C. OLSEN, LEGAL RESEARCH IN A
NUTSHELL ch. 15 (6th ed. 1996) (introduction to research in the civil law system).

257. See supra note 9 (on foreign law institutes).
258. See Peritz, supra note 7, at 80.
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and Lanyi's many perspicacious suggestions for reform in this area will
eventually be implemented!"9
Once a U.S. practitioner gathers together research aids, it may turn
out that a few hours' reading in secondary material will impart a useful
quantum of knowledge about foreign institutions. Here, the interpreter's
attitude will prove as important as obtaining reliable sources. Optimally,
a judge would display the foresight regarding "adaptation" of foreign
law displayed by the Learned Hand decision extolled above. Additionally, we can hope that judges will become increasingly accustomed to
capturing the abstract, broad principles of alien systems. Bamberger v.
Clark is one simple but notable example."W
In that case, the Jewish appellant fled from Nazi Germany and settled in the United States. He then successfully applied to a federal
agency, the custodian of his former employer's property, for funds
owned to him by such employer. The United States government contested the agency's award, arguing that controlling German law
designated Germany as the sole place of payment of the funds. This aspect of the case turned on the "meaning and interrelation" of two
provisions of the German Civil Code. Section 269 yields the default rule
that a creditor "shall render performance at the place where the debtor
resided at the time the obligation arose." Section 242, however, provides
that "the debtor is obliged to effect his performance as required by good
faith with reference to the customs of social intercourse." 26'
The employee naturally contended that conditions had changed in
Nazi Germany so radically that to demand the necessity of his return
there to collect compensation owed him would contravene Section 242's
"good faith" requirement. The government, in response, called an expert
on German law, who concluded that Section 242 "did not apply because
no German case could be found which invoked the provision to alter the
place of performance. 262
The case made its way to the appellate court in 1967, just after a
new federal rule declared that foreign law must be treated as a question
of law rather than of fact.263 Even without experience in interpreting foreign law, though, the court was not intimidated by lack of judicial
precedent for its holding, especially since German jurisprudence "is traditionally said to focus on statutory language rather than decisional precedent." Although the panel displayed some hesitation-by qualifying its
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See Sprankling & Lanyi, supra note 6, at 91-92.
Bamberger v. Clark, 390 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Bamberger,390 F.2d at 487.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 488 n.6 (citing current FED. R. CIrv. P. 44.1).
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language with the word "probable" while needlessly repeating its holding-it ruled that Section 242 was "intended to invest the German courts
with broad equity powers."2M Finally, the court even refused to make a
decision based on an unfair and wooden prediction of how a German
court might have disposed the question "while that unhappy land was
that essentially flouted rather than impleunder the sway of a regime
' 265
law.
of
rule
the
mented
Avoiding overindulgence in expert testimony, the court thus took responsibility to use a comparatively unfamiliar statutory framework. The
court wrote of the dynamic spirit of the German Civil Code and its equity provisions, and of the role of precedent in Germany, with
comprehension born not of detailed exploration but rather of sound elementary research. This opinion, then, can serve as a model for
overcoming the fear of vast labor and eventual error when extracting
foreign values. The judges in Bamberger seemed to gain confidence in
the process of learning about German law.
But, what psychology induces such felicitous judicial confidence in
the first place? As discussed above, a "shock effect" accompanies any
attempt to translate and learn foreign law. The (previously textualist)
judge will (suddenly) realize that words are unruly beyond immediate
repair. Two different responses might ensue. On the one hand, the judge
might boldly choose a dynamic paradigm, looking at the statutory language in light of values, history, social science, and so forth. Such a
response obviously calls for creativity and work, but it also provides
illumination. Alternatively, the judge's extreme uneasiness might cause
her to evade the responsibility with such tools as forum non conveniens
or else to resort with renewed energy to the conventional mode centered
around plain meaning. The judge should resist that mode if she can,
perhaps by reminding herself of the strong possibility of false similarities or of the alien regime itself condoning dynamic interpretation.
A significant difficulty crops up, though, because judges cannot
simply "resist" an accustomed mode of thought, for, as remarked above,
unconscious biases play an important role in the complex psychology of
judicial decisionmaking.26 6 True, "paradigm shifts," of the kind prerequisite to competent pre-dynamic interpretation, prove feasible in many
instances; 27 for example, many people learn to become fine translators.
Nevertheless, empirically we do not know what percentage of judges
264. Id. at 488.
265. Id. at 489.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79. For legal commentary on the important
topic of the psychology of judging, see Altman, supra note 251; Farber, supra note 145, at
554-58; Moore, supra note 123, at 914-15; Zeppos, supra note 121, at 407-10.
267. See supra notes 221-222 and accompanying text.
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who grasp the pre-dynamic method will react against it (in the psychological sense of "reaction formation") with greater formalism than
268
ever.
One might well dread the opposite scenario as well-namely, that
pre-dynamic judges will take the experiment too far and conclude that
universal indeterminacy prevails. Along these lines, Scott Altman fears
that encouraging jurists to dwell upon their own mental processes might
disastrously disillusion those who now (beneficially) deceive themselves
into believing that they are acting under constraint of law when in fact
they are acting according to their personal preferences.269
Yet my approach demands neither deep introspection170 nor the view
that judges stand free from constraint. Indeed, they should ideally feel
constrained by both the domestic interpretive community and the foreign
community into which they must imaginatively interpose themselves.
That is, rather than feeding personal preferences, judges should diligently
ferret out unfamiliar sources of conventional authority. The pre-dynamic
process will by definition also seek out legitimating rationales for those
sources. Thus, if used in anything resembling the appropriate spirit, the
method will not promote the perception of indeterminacy.
Now, possibly, a little knowledge fares worse than none, and a U.S.
judge might, after overly hasty reading in wide-ranging treatises,
"transplant" ill-suited jurisprudence for generalized domestic use.
Whether sparked consciously or unconsciously, whether fostering too
much formalism or too little, the risk exists, although it seems rather
far-fetched and probably does not outweigh the potential benefits of experimentation.
Linked inextricably with the issue of unconscious rationalization is
the issue of conscious insincerity in judging.27' A judicial opinion or legal
268. Cf Gail Heriot, Way Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1945, 1949 (1991)
(arguing that judges who learn that they are relatively unconstrained de facto "may well react
by attempting to increase the constraint imposed by law"); Zeppos, supra note 121, at 410,
412 (noting that conclusions by adherents of dynamic interpretation based upon theories of
judicial decision-making process are premature, since the process is complex and currently
unmapped).
269. See Altman, supra note 251. For criticism of Altman's article, see Heriot, supra
note 268.
270. Even Altman believes that judges should be self-conscious. "Self-consciousness
means having and trying to use a theory about the nature of one's actions. ... [Judges] do
and ought to have views about their roles as judges. These theories affect their decisions.
Opposing introspection means only that these role conceptions need not always be consistent
with a perfectly accurate view of a judge's own mental processes." Altman, supra note 251,
at 302-03.
271. See Zeppos, supra note 121, at 406-07 (arguing that judging is not a two-step
process, whereby the judge makes a decision and then justifies it in a written opinion); Scott
C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor,73 TEx. L. REV. 1307, 1316-21 (1995).
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brief that begins with references to the background values of an alien
legal system would present a radical enough departure from the norm
that one might seriously question whether judges should candidly descant upon this procedure in their opinions. At first glance, one might
suspect that judges should almost always display as much sincerity as
possible."' In the last decade, though, a large literature on judicial candor has emerged and complicated the analysis. Scott Idleman recently
wrote the most comprehensive article yet, neatly setting out many factors
both for and against candor.2 73 Moreover, other recent scholarship has addressed candor specifically in relation to statutory interpretation. 74
Foreign statutory interpretation could provide an interesting and
serviceable application of Idleman's apparatus. For example, although it
might seem that the experimentation advantage should yield the best
fruit in an open environment, Idleman cogently questions the coextensiveness of judicial sincerity and "progress." 5
I will not attempt a treatment of these issues here. Instead, as an example of the broader concern, I simply defend one maxim for judges
encountering an alien legal system: When interpreting a given country's
laws, a U.S. court need not feel obliged to mimic an insincere writing
style of that country's courts. Rather, the U.S. court should arrive at an
independently reasoned stance on whether to conceal its true rationales.
This maxim represents a corollary of the pre-dynamic approach: the
foreign substance and style are often inseparable,276 but the U.S. practitioner should adopt neither substance nor style until coherent reasons for
doing so come to light. (This corollary can be tested in the interstate
theater: Why should not a Vermont court imitate the distinctive style of
the New Hampshire Supreme Court when construing New Hampshire
law? Both because one cannot readily articulate a principle underlying
New Hampshire law that correlates with the supposed New Hampshire

272. Eskridge and MacCormick & Summers, for instance, assume that candor is a key
value. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 238; MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 6.
273. Idleman, supra note 271.
274. Citations to such scholarship are listed in Idleman, supra note 271, at 1311 n.8; for
citations to other works on judicial candor, see id. at 1309 n.2. Most pertinent here are Zeppos' two articles. Zeppos, supra note 121; Zeppos, supra note 187. See also Schauer, supra
note 151, at 725-26; Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled,37 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1107 (1995) (concerning the practice of the United States Supreme Court).

275. Idleman, supra note 271, at 1370-73.
276. For example, some foreign courts (e.g., Poland and Italy) frequently justify their
opinions with the "legs of a chair syllogism' where each premise is justified by several arguments. MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 492. The preference for this form of
reasoning, as opposed to "linear" analysis, id., can affect the result. Judges do not make up
their minds and then simply fit the result into a justificatory style. The processes of reasoning
and writing interrelate. See supra note 271.
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style and because the Vermont forum retains a minor interest in cultivating its own style.)
MacCormick and Summers note that courts in the United States, the
United Kingdom, Argentina, and Sweden tend to acknowledge the necessity for interpretive choice and to fashion elaborate, discursive
opinions. In contrast, other systems, notably the French, deliver opinions in a form which hides the "genuine justification" behind a
magisterial "facade." 2n One can easily explain, by reference to French
history, why the French judiciary feels that it must strive at least to appear subservient to the legislature.27 ' But, a U.S. tribunal discussing
French law need not fear losing legitimacy for clearly noting why it rationally chooses to deviate from plain meaning. The luxury of judging
from a remote location (far from potential reprisal of any sort) comprises one factor in favor of candor. In short, the relative strength of
several of Idleman's rationales for candor, including "accountability,"
"power," "authoritativeness," and "notice," depend upon the venue.
VIII. APPLICATION-THE ENGLISH COURTS & LEGISLATURE
A. Justifying Textualism
One of my main points in this article is that terms such as
"literalism" or "textualism" vary in meaning across legal systems. For
example, as discussed below, England cultivates its own species of plain
meaning which seeks "unambiguous" meaning and "objective" legislative purpose, and prohibits some specific sources of legislative history.
Since we cannot necessarily depict the plain meaning doctrine as stable
or fixed across national boundaries, it becomes especially important to
probe whether one should submit to a particular plain meaning rule in a
given situation. Instead of (perilously) trying to discover if a rule is generally accepted abroad, or applying it notwithstanding such empirical
data,279 one should instead query: (1) What are the merits and deficiencies of the doctrine as applied to statutes in general? (2) What factors
should one consider when deciding whether the doctrine will work well
277. See MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 16-18, 177, 501, 508; Farber,

supra note 1, at 527; supra notes 116-118 (describing French judicial style).
278. See MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 503-08.
279. Cunningham et al. have devised a way to determine empirically if a particular
word's meaning can be considered obvious. These authors surveyed a community of speakers to arrive at a principled plain meaning methodology. See Cunningham et al., supra note

182, at 1596-613. This approach does not meet our current needs. When we must translate
from an interpretive community with which we have no intimate contact, we will not have
the skills necessary to conduct an accurate Cunningham-type survey.
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when faced with a given country's laws? and then, (3) Taking these
factors into account, are there any underlying values in the particular
alien legal system that lead us to favor the rule in this specific case?
In this section and the next, which discusses punctuation of English
statutes, I use England as a thought experiment. Because of the relatively minor language and culture barrier, one can proceed through the
steps of pre-dynamic interpretation with ease, a sort of trial run for more
remote travels in the future. In this relatively simple case, the time expended to research and study the following information would not
oppress a busy lawyer. For this section, I have relied heavily upon just
two articles describing the English legal system. Once someone has determined what sources of authority to consult in her interpretation of
English statutes, research aids are readily available to guide her through
those sources.'
The task here requires us to move beyond the frequently dispatched
but bald statement that, "The English [are] champions of the plainmeaning approach.... The English formulation presents the most extreme view."' 8' In late 1992, after years of criticism and debate, the
House of Lords ruled that the English courts may consider parliamentary materials where:
(a) legislation is ambiguous or obscure, or leads to an absurdity;
(b) the material relied on consists of one or more statements by
a minister or other promoter of the Bill together with such other
parliamentary material as is necessary to understand such
statements and their effect;
(c) the statements relied on are clear."'
To sufficiently understand the importance and limitations of this decision, however, one must understand its history.2"3
Even a relatively superficial reconstruction of the English system
shows that in some ways the English system is strikingly different from
the U.S. system at the level of principles and "flavor." As William Jordan summarizes, "However interconnected their roots may seem, each

280. See, e.g., COHEN & OLSEN, supra note 256, ch. 14. In this section, I assume that
no English cases on point have been located, so that the foreign individual must resort to the
statutory text and other sources.
281. Kelch, supranote 120, at 310. Many other U.S. articles make similar claims.
282. Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42, 69 (H.L.).
283. For details about this decision, see, for example, Gordon Bale, ParliamentaryDebates and Statutory Interpretation:Switching On the Light or Rummaging In the Ashcans of
the Legislative Process,74 CAN. B. REv. 1, 13-17 (1995).
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system derives from very different historical trajectories." 2MEnglish legal history has tended to follow a formalist approach, emphasizing
authoritative sources of law-both precedent and legislation. In part,
this preference derives from the fact that English lawyers "consciously
threw all their weight behind Parliament" in its political struggles
against the prerogatives of the monarch:
The Common Law became a mighty weapon in the hands of the
Parliamentary party ... , for in its long history it had developed a
certain tenacity, its very cumbrous and formalistic technique
serving to make it less vulnerable to direct attack from above.
Ever since then, Englishmen have thought of the Common law as
being the essential guarantee of freedom, serving to protect the
2M
citizen against the arbitrary inroads of absolute authority ....
In the nineteenth century, the views of Jeremy Bentham had an
"enormous influence" and solidified this formalist perspective.2 Today,
the English continue to "believe that the best way to achieve justice is to
follow the rules as plainly written. Although injustice may occur in
some cases, reliance upon plain meaning is seen as 'the best way of
minimizing risk of error." '27 On the contrary, we can grossly simplify
(yet retain a useful distinction) by declaring that the U.S. interpreter will
tend to concern herself with the need to achieve justice and retain individual autonomy.'
Numerous political, judicial, and cultural institutions dynamically
interact with theoretical doctrine to produce England's own plain
meaning approach. At best, we want to reconstruct as many such reasons as we can to explain why the system adhered to formalist views
and developed its current doctrine. But, with limited time for background reading, we should concentrate on current political institutions.
We should try to reconstruct a notion of the entire English political system in a manner that stands comprehensible to any conscientious U.S.
judge. If we find that we do not yet posess a coherent perspective on the
basic system, we should delve further into background sources such as
the rudiments of medieval statute-creation procedure and Benthamite

284. William S. Jordan, III, Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation:The Relevance of English Practice,29 U.S.F L. REV. 1, 18 (1994).
285. ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra note 168, at 202 (emphasis omitted).
286. Id. at 204; see also Jordan, supra note 284, at 19.
287. Jordan, supra note 284, at 19 (quoting P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERTS. SUMMERS, FORM
AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 106 (1987)).

288. Id.
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philosophy. Consider, then, the following five contrasts of English with
U.S. institutions.
1. Legislative Bodies
The fundamental difference between the U.S. and English legislatures involves their relationship to their respective executive branches.
"In England, the executive has virtually complete control over the legislature" ' 9 The Prime Minister and his cabinet are all members of the
House of Commons; they lead the dominant party in the House. Party
discipline is also very strong in England. Consequently, bills proposed
by the executive usually pass in Parliament without substantial alteration. Since the government need not compromise with the (weak)
opposition, it can pen relatively unambiguous laws. That is, the government can aim to and often succeed in resolving issues "plainly."
In the past four decades, the English have moved back towards an effort to find legislative "purpose" 291 While the English courts speak in
terms of Parliament's objective intent, the relevant intent is effectively that
of the incumbent government forging party policy. Hence, government
proclamations and statements of ministers or others proposing legislation
seem relatively reliable indicators of "legislative intent." We must contrast
such statements of the proposers with declarations made on the floor of
Parliament, which often represent mere posturing, since the outcome of
the debates hardly matter. Pepper v. Hart rationally suggests a "middle
ground" where the courts should consider only particularly probative material, such as committee reports, and only if that material provides a
reasonably clear answer to the question at hand.f 2
2. Legislative Committees
In the United States, congressional committees play a "central role in
developing legislation." But, in England, by the time a bill is introduced
into the House of Commons, the government has "already achieved the
policy development and political bartering that happens in U.S. legislative
committees. This fundamental difference is reflected in the subservient
and transitory position of the primary legislative committees in the House
of Commons." 3 They propose only minor emendations.
289. Id. at 21.
290. Id. at 22.
291. Bale, supra note 283, at 17. The timing and extent of this shift to a "purposive"
approach has been contested. See Raoul Berger, Original Intent: The Rage of Hans Baade,
71 N.C. L. REv. 1151, 1156 (1993).
292. Jordan, supra note 284, at 27.
293. Id. at 28,29.
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The result for our purposes is that English legal history registers no
near-equivalent to the U.S. debate about whether to exclude consideration of congressional committee reports. A U.S. practitioner searching
for parallels to congressional committee reports will find them in a perhaps unexpected place. Even before Pepper v. Hart, English courts
allowed consideration of two types of extrinsic materials roughly comparable in some respects to our legislative history: (1) Royal
Commission reports, to the extent that they form the basis or impetus
for parliamentary enactments, may be considered in judicial efforts to
interpret those enactments;2 (2) White Papersor other statements of the
government concerning proposed or impending legislation were also
permitted. All of these materials constitute the legislature's primary explanation of the statute and its goals. 29
By delving into the political structure of the nation, one avoids the
"false similarity" between congressional committees and the House of
Commons' committees. Conversely, by such study one realizes the
profitable "true similarity" between the U.S. committee reports and the
two English sources just described.
3. Legislative Drafting
Virtually all legislation introduced into Parliament is drafted by an
elite office devoted to that task.26 This practice perpetuates a tradition of
careful drafting that reaches back hundreds of years. In medieval England, no one paid much attention to the precise wording of most
legislation, for parliamentary acts were available only in unofficial versions, often corrupt or incomplete or altogether spurious.'
Yet
prominent medieval English jurists actually helped draft some statutes.
This role probably led to relatively restrictive readings of those statutes.
Moreover, by the sixteenth century, "Legislative drafting was... carried
out with such skill by Crown lawyers ...that judges were manifestly
being discouraged from the creative exegesis they had bestowed on medieval statutes."298 The nineteenth century then saw a helpful
restructuring of the statutes as a whole.2
In contrast to the general experience of the United States, then,
English statutes are now drafted by a very small, highly qualified, and
294. The Royal Commissions are independent advisory bodies of recognized experts
assigned to examine and report upon particular issues.
295. See id. at 32.
296. See id. at 33.
297. See JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 235-37 (3d
ed. 1990).

298. Id. at 237.
299. See CARLETON K. ALLEN, LAW INTHE MAKING 423-28 (7th ed. 1964).
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homogeneous group, and such drafting is not much adulterated in compromise-seeking committees. The result is relatively greater clarity in
English legislation, and hence less need to examine extrinsic sources.'
4. The Constitutional System & the Judiciary
In contrast to the United States, the English courts have no authority
to invalidate an act of their legislature. Since the executive leads the
dominant party in the legislature, the problem is not so much how to
keep each branch within its proper sphere but rather "how to assure the
dominance of Parliament as a democratically legitimate body and protect individual liberties against a nearly omnipotent government." '°
The English courts have confronted this problem by, among other
solutions, refusing to consider various statements of a bill's proponents
except when the statements comprise an official explanation by the executive to Parliament. Such refusal helps curb excessive government
power.3 Although Pepper v. Hart now permits the consideration of previously excluded materials, it appears to do so in a limited manner
consistent with this constitutional concern. 3 Thus, this specific advantage of the plain meaning approach becomes particularly germane in the
English system. Analogous values underlie new textualist and legal
process arguments for holding the legislature narrowly to its texts. Yet
in our own regime of checks and balances, the same argument, while
cogent, does not carry as much weight.
Statutory correction of perceived judicial errors occurs relatively
frequently in England. As a result, there is less need for judges to struggle to discern legislative intent. If literalism produces an unwanted
result, Parliament may well correct the problem. Parliament, however,
will rarely if ever correct a misreading by a U.S. court, which is one
factor discouraging such literalism by a U.S. interpreter.
On the other hand, lack of parliamentary control should give a dynamic U.S. interpreter pause, too. English judges' background,
education, and training reinforce a common judicial culture. They are

300. See Jordan, supra note 284, at 34. But see S.H. BAILEY & M.J. GuNN, THE
MODERN ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 251 (2d ed. 1991) (summarizing a 1975 report which
noted that drafters worked under considerable "pressures and constraints that made it very
difficult to produce simple and clear legislation").
301. Jordan, supra note 284, at 35.
302. See id; supra note 224 (citing legislative signaling as one advantage of plain
meaning approach).
303. The courts may consider only "statements by a minister or other promoter of the
Bill, together if necessary with such other parliamentary material as is necessary to understand such statements and their effect." Pepper v. Hart [1993], 1 All E.R. 42, 69 (H.L.).
304. See Jordan, supra note 284, at 38; cf.supra note 224.
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"predominantly wealthy white males of late middle-age, a very large
percentage of whom were educated at the same two universities." 5
Also, "English judges rise through the ranks largely by virtue of their
ability as legal technicians " '30 The typical English "insider" (legislator
and jurist) will thus be imbued with the "profoundly conservative,"
formalist outlook delineated above.
Consequently, it would be unwise for a U.S. practitioner who has
just familiarized herself with the rudiments of current English values to
skip over legislative history after confronting an unclear statute and
hence to interpret with reference solely to values, even if the British
themselves would not inspect that legislative history for the answer. For,
part of the English values, ignored by such a judge, assumes that judicial political will does not need much restraint, because English judges
already have a tradition of restraint, and because English legislators
have a tradition of overruling maverick judges.
As an outsider, the U.S. practitioner must attempt to discern this
whole system. Then, she should approximate its perspective as best she
can. If some text is unclear to her, she might well be missing some semantic clue available to insiders that makes the text seem clear to them.
Moreover, the English rarely deal with compromise statutes, and hence
they rarely "discover" severe ambiguity. If no unbiased insider can give
advice, the judge who feels that she is missing something obvious to
insiders should glean clues from "forbidden" sources rather than hazard
a guess, grounded on non-legislative sources, about the legislation's
purpose. It remains within the spirit of the English system to hold to any
legislative source, if helpful, rather than guessing or ignoring Parliament's purpose. In fact, before Pepper v. Hart (and no doubt continuing
thereafter), English judges themselves frequently "cheat," looking to
forbidden sources "for guidance or to check that their interpretation accords with the purpose of the statute."'
Part of the task of the good U.S. translator or agent involves laying
aside the urge to inject politics into a decision that must fit within a
system of relatively technical and conservative judging. Moreover, if the
statutory meaning does seem clear to the U.S. practitioner, she should
typically trust the text and not search too assiduously for ambiguity. If
this conclusion seems anticlimactic after pages of examination of a different regime, we should bear in mind that the conclusion follows from
the examination, and not vice-versa. As Eskridge declares, the strongest
305. Jordan, supra note 284, at 39.

306. Id. at 40.
307. Bale, supra note 283, at 26.
308. Id. at 17.
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interpretation is one that, like a cable, weaves together several mutually
supporting threads. So, after the initial search for abstract institutional
values, the U.S. interpreter will then come to grips with the basic outline
of legislative purpose and the whole act under consideration. Jumping
now to the level of the particular statutory phrase at issue, she will still
remain acutely aware of any strangeness of the statute in its context.
Yet, simultaneously, the larger investigation may condition her to expect
relative textual clarity in England-compared with, say, the clarity of a
statute prepared by a divided legislature which then is translated by
someone with a discernible bias towards vague translations. Therefore,
if what she reads still seems unambiguous-at this late stage of the investigation-such a reading is supported by a cable of understandings,
not the thread of a monolithic plain meaning practice.
5. Legal Resources
Some institutional differences between England and the United States
need not deter U.S. judges from fashioning improved hybrid law. English
judges, even at the highest level, have far fewer resources than U.S.
judges. For instance, English judges do not hire law clerks, and the courts
of last resort usually sit continuously. Thus, they simply do not have the
same amount of time as their U.S. counterparts to ponder the intricacies of
legislative history or to write long opinions.3 Certainly, U.S. judges can
use their "extra" time to learn about the unfamiliar legal system and to
write full opinions. These luxuries support rule of law values by making
the final decisions more trustworthy. But, such factors do not imply that
the domestic judge should often quote from forbidden sources. The litigants would not reasonably expect that consequence.
B. The PunctuationCanon
Every canon of construction conceals some underlying institutional
values, even the so-called grammar or syntax canons.310 Consider the
punctuation canon, which in the United States has assumed "at least three
forms":
(1) [A]dhering to the strict English rule that punctuation forms no
part of the statute; (2) allowing punctuation as an aid in statutory
construction; and (3) looking on punctuation as a less-than-

309. See Jordan, supra note 284, at 37. English judges typically render their decisions
from the bench at the close of argument. See id.
310. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 208, at 925 (arguing that there is more to unify than to divide the canons in statutory interpretation).
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desirable, last-ditch alternative aid in statutory construction. The
last approach.., seems to have prevailed as the majority rule."'
The "strict English rule" that interpreters should disregard punctuation
made sense during the several centuries during which England enacted
statutes primarily in unpunctuated form. In fact, punctuation was sometimes inserted by clerks or printers after parliamentary action!" But, as
Raymond Marcin has argued, the rule makes little sense in contemporary England, where punctuation is included as a matter of course in
every bill." 3 While several commentators now urge that punctuation be
treated as an indispensable part of the text, equal in status to the words
themselves,"" a general reluctance to do so persists both in the United
States and in England.
Such reluctance, even where punctuation is included prior to every
enactment, can be predicated upon a couplet of rational arguments.
First, if we cannot trust legislators to know and follow the basic conventions of grammar, then we should not necessarily allow grammar to
be determinative, especially if we can discover legislative intent in some
more secure manner. 5 Second, if, at any point in the legislative and
printing process within a given jurisdiction, careful editing takes a back
seat, then punctuation becomes suspect. In parliaments where compromise is rife, lack of drafting clarity may consistently result. Italy, for
example, often displays contradictory or inconsistent drafting, due
partly to a decline in technical ability, partly to increasing complexity of
subject matter, and largely to the "fact that law texts are proposed by
coalition governments representing four or five political parties, which
means that the texts produced are almost always the outcome of compromises (which at times are only verbal). ' ' 16 (Incidentally, where bad
drafting is endemic, various actions can help solve the problem. In Mexico, for example, subsequent issues of the official gazettes frequently

311. Raymond B. Marcin, Punctuation and the Interpretationof Statutes, 9 CONN. L..

REV. 227, 240 (1977).
312. One old statute (written in Law French) was punctuated by traverse lines on the

Rolls of Parliament. A fascinating case sent a man to the gallows on the basis of that punctuation. See id. at 227-33.
313. Id. at234-35.
314. See Kelch, supra note 120, at 331-32, and references contained therein; DC
PEARCE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN AUSTRALIA 55 (1981) (bemoaning the continued
use of the English rule in Australia).
315. See Marcin, supra note 311, at 243 (citing New York law).
316. MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note 14, at 217.
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correct errors in statutory texts.'" This is also the sort of information
that a U.S. interpreter needs to know.")
We can safely conclude that neither of these two rationales holds
true in the British legislature. For, we now know that statutes there are
drafted by highly professional, highly educated people at the behest of a
political party assured of success. Suppose, then, that we are convinced
that the strict English rule is illogical. Should a U.S. court still invoke it,
when gaping at an English comma, simply because the English courts
and lawmakers often do so? Only if the court believes that the legislature deliberately uses punctuation carelessly, since the legislature
assumes that courts will ignore, or at least subordinate, the punctuation.
In exploring this matter, suppose that the U.S. researcher hunts
down a 1996 English law review article establishing that the strict rule
still constitutes the clear majority position, but that the modem trend
pushes against it. I argue that the U.S. practitioner should not hesitate to
adopt the modem trend. From what we have learned about its procedures, we cannot seriously infer that the English Parliament continually
and confidently relies upon sloppy grammar. Furthermore, given contemporary procedures, the old rule is incoherent. It flies in the face of
the (coherent) English practice of privileging the legislature's literal text
as enacted. Taking the plain meaning of Parliament makes sense; taking
the plain meaning of the strict punctuation rule does not. Perhaps in Italy,
if courts there wield the structural power to encroach like this upon the
legislative branch, one might rationally choose to subordinate punctuation.
The pre-dynamic approach can test such speculative propositions.
Features of comparative legal culture aside, it is imperative to translate punctuation and other graphological information. Different languages
have different punctuation standards, and disaster could result from a
reckless attitude towards this fact.319 Finally, whether to adopt a canon may
depend upon the specific statute. For instance, one might place particular
reliance on punctuation of a statute that has been repeatedly reenacted
without alteration in the punctuation.' 2° Alternatively, one might suspect
punctuation in any piece of hurriedly enacted legislation. Congress once
317. See Stem, supra note 33, at 33.
318. Another example, diametrically opposed: Bills of the federal government in Germany are prepared in "a highly professional manner:' and then at least three readings in
parliament are necessary in order to pass a statute. MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, supra note

14, at 117.
319. Perhaps one should think of the process as involving not just translation but also
"decoding." See Ainsworth, supra note 49, at 548 ("Written in an archaic style without
punctuation and frequently lacking obvious syntactic or morphological cues to sentence
structure, classical Chinese texts are not so much read as decoded.").
320. See NORMAN 1. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.15 (5th
ed. 1992).
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passed a bill composed in part from photocopied memoranda and lastminute hand-written additions, which contained "accidental entries such
as a name and phone number-Ruth Seymour, 225-4844--standing
alone as if it were a special appropriation item. 321

CONCLUSION

This article has tentatively linked theory of translation and of comparative law to the specific apparatus of dynamic statutory interpretation
theory. Along the way, easy practical solutions have not surfaced; no
facile formulae exist for dodging the problem of false similarities.
While we must therefore "reconstruct" coherent institutional values as a
basis for foreign statutory interpretation, we should greet all such reconstructions cautiously. Yet the key to effectively facing the diversity of
hermeneutical approaches within a given foreign regime and across regimes is not to abandon our (extant but sporadic) attempts at independent
research, but rather to undertake such research more boldly. Imagination
and sensitivity to context should be celebrated. Hence, the confident state
of mind prerequisite to such traits should also be encouraged.
While risks inhere in encouraging judicial imagination, a dynamic
stance in this area seems well worth the risks. An interpreter who ultimately realizes that plain meaning constitutes a better way to deal with a
difficult foreign statute will nevertheless have achieved important advantages by not having prematurely closed off a wide-ranging inquiry.
My proposed approach not only helps the interpreter to choose the best
method under the circumstances, but it also enlightens her about the
very task of interpretation writ large.

321. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 119, at 652 (quoting.Sorenson v. Secretary of
the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 867 (1986)).

